











DISTURBED CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY 

ITS CAUSE 


AND 


THE REMEDY: 


IlSr THREE RA.RTS. 


JiY 

JANriuS W. GlIEEN, 

I* 


OF 


WASIirXCfTON, D. C. 

W. ir. MOOKK, PRINT, 511 KREVKNTII ST. 

1879 . 





PART III. 


Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1879, by 
JAMES W. GREEN, of Culpeper, Virginia, 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 


7 ? 


F R T I 


< 1 ^ 


I'HE i’llINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 

GOVERNMENT. 


[extracted, with a few emendations, FROM THE WRITINGS OF AN AMERICAN 
STATESMAN, DECEASED MORE THAN A QUARTER OF A CENTURY.] 

“ In order to liave a clear and just conception of tlie nature and object of gov¬ 
ernment, it is indispensable to understand correctly wliat that constitution or law of 
our nature is, in which government originates ; or, to express it more fully and 
accurately,—that law, without which government would not, and with which, it must 
necessarily exist. Without this, it is as impossible to lay any solid foundation for the 
science of government, as it would be to lay one for that of astronomy, without a 
like understanding of that constitution or law of the material world, according to 
which the several bodies composing the solar system mutually act on each other, and 
by which they are kept in their respective spheres. The first question, accordingly, 
to be considered is,—What is that constitution or law of our nature, without which 
government would not exist, and with which its existence is necessary? 

“ In considerinjr this, I assume, as an incontestable fact, that man is so constituted 
as to be a social being. His inclinations and wants, physical and moral, irresistibly 
impel him to associate with his kind ; and he has, accordingly, never been found, in 
any age or country, in any state other than the social. In no other, indeed, could he 
exist ; and in no other,—were it possible for him to exist,—could he attain to a full 
development of his moral and intellectual faculties, or raise himself, in the scale of 
being, much above the level of the brute creation. 

“ I next assume, also, as a fact not less incontestable, that, while man is so con 
stituted as to make the social state necessary to his existence and the full develop¬ 
ment of his faculties, this state itself cannot exist without government. The 
assumption rests on universal experience. In no age or country has any society or 
community ever been found, whether enlightened or savage, without government 
of some description. 

“ Having assumed these, as unquestionable phenomena of our nature, I shall, 
without further remark, proceed to the investigation of the primary and important 
question,—What is that constitution of our nature, which, while it impels man to 
associate with his kind, renders it impossible for society to exist without govern¬ 
ment ? 

“ The answer will be found in the fact, (not less incontestable than either of the 
others,) that, while man is created for the social state, and is accordingly so formed 
as to feel what affects others, as well as what affects himself, he is, at the same time, 
so constituted as to feel more intensely what affects him directly, than what affects 
him indirectly through others ; or, to express it differently, he is so constituted, that 
his direct or individual affections are stronger than his sympathetic or social feelings. 
I intentionally avoid the expression, selfish feelings, as applicable to the former ; be¬ 
cause, as commonly used, it implies an unusual excess of the individual over the 
social feelings, in the person to whom it is applied ; and, consequently, something 
depraved and vicious. My object is, to exclude such inference, and to restrict the 
inquiry exclusively to facts in their hearings on the subject under consideration, 
viewed as mere phenomena appertaining to our nature,—constituted as it is; and 



wliicli iii’c US aiujaestionuble as is that of gravitation, or any other plienonienon of 
the material world. 

“ In asserting’ that our individual are stronger than our social feelings, it is not 
intended to deny that there are instances, growing out of peculiar relations, as that 
of a mother and her infant,—or resulting from the force of education and habit 
over peculiar constitutions, in which the latter have overpowered the former ; but 
these instances are few, and always regarded as something extraordinary. I he deep 
impression they make, whenever they occur, is the strongest proof that they are 
regarded as exceptions to some general and well understood law of our nature ; just 
as some of the minor powers of the material woi’ld are apparently to gravitation. 

“ I might go farther, and assert this to be a phenomenon, not of our nature only, 
but of all animated existence, throughout its entire range, so far as our knowledge 
extends. It would, indeed, seem to be essentially connected with the great law of 
self-preservation which pervades all that feels, from man down to the lowest and 
most insignificant reptile or insect. In none is it stronger than in man. Ilis social 
feelings may, indeed, in a state of safety and abundance, combined with high intel¬ 
lectual and moral culture, acquire great expansion and force ; but not so great as to 
overpower this all-pervading and essential law of animated existence. 

“ But that constitution of our nature which makes us feel more intensely what 
affects us directly than what affects us indirectly through others, necessarily leads to 
conflict between individuals. Each, in consequence, has a greater regard for his own 
safety or happiness, than for the safety or happiness of others ; and, where these come 
in opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to his own. And hence, the 
tendency to a universal state of conflict, between individual and individual ; accom¬ 
panied by the connected passions of suspicion, jealousy, anger and revenge,—fol¬ 
lowed by insolence, fraud and cruelty ;—and, if not prevented by some controlling 
power, ending in a state of universal discord and confusion, destructive of the social 
state and the ends for which it is ordained. This controlling power, wherever vested, 
or by \vhomsoever exercised, is goveunment. 

It follows, then, that man is so constituted, that government is necessary to 
the existence of society, and society to his existence, and the perfection of his facul¬ 
ties, It follows, also, that government has its origin in this twofold constitution of 
his natnre ; the sympathetic or social feelings constituting the remote,—and the 
individual or direct, the proximate cause. 

“ If man had been diffei’ently constituted in either particular ;—if, instead of 
being social in his natnre, he had been created without syiiii)athy for his kind, and 
independent of others for his safety and existence ; or if, on the other hand, he had 
been so created, as to feel more intensely what affected others than what affected 
himself, (if that were possible,) or, even, had this supposed interest been equal,—it 
is manifest that, in either case, there would have been no necessity for government, 
and that none would ever have existed. But, although society and government are 
thus intimately connected with and dependent on each other,—of the two societv is 
the greater. It is the first in the order of things, and in the dignity of its object; that 
of society being primary,—to preserve and perfect our race ; and that of government 
secondary and subordinate, to preserve and perfect society. Both are, however, neces¬ 
sary to the existence and well-being of our race, and equally of Divine ordination. 

“ I have said,—if it were possible for man to be so constituted, as to feel what 

affects others more strongly than what affects himself, or even as strongly,_ 

because, it may be well doubted, whether the stronger feeling or affection of indi¬ 
viduals for themselves, combined with a feebler and subordinate feeling or affection 
for others, is not, in beings of limited reason and faculties, a constitution necessary 
to their preservation and existence. If reversed,—if their feelings and affections 
were stronger for others than for themselves, or even as strong, the necessarv result 
would seem to be, that all individuality would be lost; and boundless and remedi¬ 
less disorder and confusion would ensue. For each, at the same moment, iiitenselv 


4 


participating in all the conflicting emotions of those around him, would, of course, 
forget himself and all that concerned him immediately, in his oflicious intermed¬ 
dling with the affairs of all others ; which, from his limited reason and faculties, he 
could neither properly understand nor manage. Such a state of things would, as far 
as we can see, lead to endless disorder and confusion, not less destructive to our race 
than a state of anarchy. It would, besides, be remediless,—for government would 
be impossible ; or, if it could by possibility exist, its object, would be reversed. 
Selfishness would have to be encouraged, and benevolence discouragcal. Individuals 
would have to be encouraged, by rewards, to become more selfish, anti deterred, 
by punishments, from being too benevolent; and this, too, by a government, admin¬ 
istered by those who, on the supposition, would have the greatest aversion for self¬ 
ishness and tlie highest admiration for benevolence. 

“To the Infinite Being, the Creator of all, belongs exclusively the care and super¬ 
intendence of the whole. lie, in his infinite wdsdoni and goodness, has allotted to 
every class of animated beings its condition and appropriate functions ; and has 
endowed each with feelings, instincts, ca])acities, and faculties, best adapted to its 
allotted condition. To man, he has assigned the social and political state, as best 
adapted to develop the great capacities and faculties, intellectual and moral, with 
which he has endowed him ; and has, accordingly, constituted him so'as not only to 
impel him into the social state, but to make government necessary for his preserva¬ 
tion and well-being. 

“ But government, although intended to protect and preserve society, has itself a 
strong tendency to disorder and abuse of its powers, as all experience and almost 
every page of history testify. The caitse is to be found in the same constitution of 
our nature which makes government indispensable. The powers which it is neces¬ 
sary for government to possess, in order to repress violence and preserve order, cannot 
execute themselves. They must be administered by men in Avhom, like others, the 
individual are stronger than the social feelings. And hence, the j^owers vested in 
them to ])revent injustice and oppression on the part of others, will, if left un¬ 
guarded, be by them converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the com¬ 
munity. That, by which this is prevented, b}-- whatever name called, is what is 
meant by CONSTITUTION, in its most comprehensive sense, when applied to govern¬ 
ment. 

“ Having its origin in the same principle of our nature, eovstitvtwn stands to 
go'oernment, SiB gooerninent stands to society; and, as the end for which society is 
ordained, would be defeated without government, so that for which government is 
ordained Avould, in a great measure, be defeated without constitution. But they 
differ in this striking particular. There is no difficulty in forming g'overnment. It is 
not even a matter of choice, whether there shall be one or not. Like breathing, it is 
not permitted to depend on our volition. Necessity will force it on all communities 
in some one form or another. Very different is the case as to constitution. Instead 
of a matter of necessity, it is one of the most difficult tasks imposed on man to form 
a constitution worthy of the name ; while, to form a perfect one.—one that would 
completely counteract the tendency of government to oppression and abuse, and hold 
it strictly to the great ends for wdiich it is ordained,—has thus far exceeded human 
wisdom, and possibly ever Avill. From this, another striking difference results. 
Constitution is the contrivance of man, while government is of Divine ordination. 
Man is left to perfect what the wisdom of the Infinite ordained, as necessary to pre¬ 
serve the race. 

“ With these remarks, I proceed to the consideration of the important and difficult 
question; How is this tendency of government to be counteracted ? Or, to express 
it more fully,—How can those who are invested with the ]mwers of government be 
prevented from employing them, as the means of aggrandizing themselves, instead 
of using them to protect and preserve .society? It cannot be done by instituting a 
higher power to control the government, and those who administer it. This would 


be but to change the seat of authority, and to make this higher power, in reality, 
the government; with the same tendency, on the part of those wlio might control its 
powers, to pervert them into instruments of aggrandizement. Nor can it be done by 
limiting the powers of government, so as to make it too feeble to be made an instru¬ 
ment of abuse; foi*, passing by the difficulty of so limiting its powers, without 
creating a power higher than the government itself to enforce the observance of the 
limitations, it is a sufficient objection that it would, if practicable, defeat the end for 
which government is ordained, by making it too feeble to protect and preserve 
society. The powers necessary for this purpose will ever prove sufficient to 
aggrandize those who control it, at the expense of the rest of the community. 

“ In estimating what amount of power would be requisite to secure the objects 
of government, we must take into the reckoning, what would be necessary to defend 
the community against external, as Avell as internal dangers. Government must be 
able to repel assaults from abroad, as well as to repress violence and disorders within. 
It must not be overlooked, that the human race is not comprehended in a single 
society or community. The limited reason and faculties of man, the great diversity 
of language, customs, pursuits, situation and complexion, and the difficulty of inter¬ 
course, with various other causes, hav’e, by their operation, formed a great many 
separate communities, acting independently of each other. Between these there is the 
same tendency to conflict,—and from the same constitution of our nature,—as between 
men individually; and even stronger,—because the sympathetic or .social feelings 
are not so .strong between different communities, as between individuals of the same 
community. So powerful, indeed, is this tendency, that it has led to almost incessant 
wars between contiguous communities for plunder and conquest, or to avenge 
injuries, real or supposed, 

“ So long as this state of things continues, exigencies will occur, in which the 
entire powers and resources of the community will be needed to defend its existence. 
When this is at stake, every other consideration must yield to it. Self-preservation 
is the supreme law, as well with communities as individuals. And hence the danger 
of withholding from government the full command of the power and resources of 
the state ; and the great difficulty of limiting its ])Owers consistently with the pro¬ 
tection and preservation of the community. And hence the question recurs,—By 
what means can government, without being divested of the full command of the 
resources of the community, be prevented from abusing its powers ? 

“ The question involves difficulties which, from the earliest ages, wise and good 
men have attempted to overcome ;—but hitherto with but partial success. For this 
purpose many devices have been resorted to, suited to the various stages of intelli¬ 
gence and civilization through which our race has passed, and to the different forms 
of government to which they have been applied. The aid of superstition, ceremonies, 
education, religion, organic arrangements, both of the government and the com¬ 
munity, has been, from time to time, appealed to. Some of the most remarkable of 
these devices, whether regarded in reference to their wisdom and the skill displaved 
in their application, or to the permanency of their effects, are to be found in the earlv 
dawn of civilization ;—in the institutions of the Egyptians, the Hindoos, the Chinese, 
and the Jews. The only materials which that early age afforded for the construction 
of constitutions, when intelligence was so partially diffused, were applied with 
consummate wisdom and skill. To their successful application may be fairlv traced 
the subsequent advance of our race in civilization and intelligence, of which we now 
enjoy the benefits. For, without a constitution,—something to counteract the strong 
tendency of government to disorder and abuse, and to give stability to political 
institutions,—there can be little progress or permanent improvement, 

“ In answering the important question under consideration, it is not necessary to 
enter into an examination of the various contrivances adopted by these celebrated 
governments to counteract this tendency to disorder and abuse, nor to undertake 
to treat of constitution in its most comprehensive sense. What I propose is far 


6 


more limited,—to explain on what principles government must be formed, in order 
to resist, by its own interior structure,—or, to use a single term, organism, —the 
tendency to abuse of power. This structure, or organism, is what is meant by con¬ 
stitution, in its strict and more usual sense ; and it is this which distinguishes, what 
are called, constitutional governments from absolute. It is in this strict and more 
usual sense that I propose to use the term hereafter. 

“ How government, then, must be constructed, in order to counteract, through its 
organism, this tendency on the part of those who make and execute the laws to 
oppress those subject to their operation, is the next question which claims attention. 

“ There is but one way in which this can possibly be done ; and that is by such an 
organism as will furnish the ruled with the means of resisting successfully this 
tendency on the part of the rulers to oj^pression and abuse. Power can only be re¬ 
sisted by power,—and tendency by tendency. Those who exercise power and those 
subject to its exercise,—the rulers and the ruled,—stand in antagonistic relations to 
each other. The same constitution of our nature which leads rulers to oppress the 
ruled,—regardless of the object for which government is ordained,—will, with 
equal strength, lead the ruled to resist, when possessed of the means of making 
peaceable and effective resistance. Such an organism, then, as will furnish the 
means by which resistance may be systematically and peaceably made on the part 
of the ruled, to oppression and abuse of power on the part of the rulers, is the first 
and indispensable step towards forming a constitutional government. And as this 
can only be effected by or through the right of suffrage,—(the right on the part of 
the ruled to choose their rulers at proper intervals,and to hold them thereby respon¬ 
sible for their conduct,)—the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled, through the 
right of suffrage, is the indispensable and primary principle in the foundation of a 
constitutional government. When this right is properly guarded, and the people 
sufficiently enlightened to understand their own rights and the interests of the com¬ 
munity. and duly to appreciate the motives and conduct of those appointed to make 
and execute the laws, it is all-sufficient to give to those who elect, effective control 
over those they have elected. 

“ I call the right of suffrage the indispensable and primary principle ; for it would 
be a great and dangerous mistake to suppose, as many do, that it is, of itself, 
sufficient to form constitutional governments. To this erroneous opinion may be 
traced one of the causes, why so few attempts to form constitutional governments 
have succeeded ; and why, of the few which have, so small a number have had 
durable existence. It has led, not only to mistakes in the attempts to form such 
governments, but to their overthrow, when they have, by some good fortune, been 
correctly formed. So far from being, of itself, sufficient,—however well guarded it 
might be, and however enlightened the people,—it would, unaided by other pro¬ 
visions, leave the government as absolute, as it would be in the hands of irrespon¬ 
sible rulers ; and with a tendency, at least as strong, towards oppression and abuse 
of its powers ; as I shall next proceed to explain. 

“ The right of suffrage, of itself, can do no more than give complete contt'ol to 
those who elect, over the conduct of those they have elected. In doing this, it 
accomplishes all it possibly can accomplish. This is its aim,—and when this is 
attained, its end is fulfilled. It can do no more, however enlightened the people, or 
however widely extended or well guarded the right may be. The sum total, then, 
of its effects, when most successful, is, to make those elected, the true and faithful 
representatives of those who elected them,—instead of irresponsible rulers,—as they 
would be without it; and thus, by converting it into an agency, and the rulers into 
agents, to divest government of all claims to sovereignty, and to retain ii unimpaired 
to the community. But it is manifest that the right of suffrage, in making these 
changes, transfers, in reality, the actual control over the government, from those 
who make and execute the laws, to the body of the community ; and, thereby, places 
the powers of the government as fully in the mass of the community, as they would 


V 


be if they, in fact, had assembled, made, and executed the laws themselves, without 
the intervention of representatives or agents. The more })erfeGtly it does this, the 
more perfectly it accomplishes its ends : but in doing so, it only changes the seat of 
authority, without counteracting, in the least, the tendenc}" of the government to 
oppression and abuse of its powers. 

“ If the whole community had the same interests, so that the interests of each and 
every portion would be so affected by the action of the government, that the laws 
which oy)pressed or impoverished one portion, would necessarily oppress and im¬ 
poverish all others,—or the reverse,—then the right of suffrage, of itself, would be 
all-sufficient to counteract the tendency of the government to oppression and abuse 
of its powers ; and, of course, would form, of itself, a perfect constitutional govern¬ 
ment. The interest of all being the same, by supposition, as far as the action of the 
government was concerned, all would have like interests as to what laws should be 
made, and how they should be executed. All strife and struggle would cease as to 
who should be elected to make and execute them. The only question would be, 
who was most fit; who the wisest and most capable of understanding the common 
interest of the whole. This decided, the election would pass otf quietly, and with¬ 
out party discord ; as no one portion could advance its own peculiar interest without 
regard to the rest, by electing a favorite candidate. 

“ But such is not the case. On the contrary, nothing is more difficult than to 
equalize the action of the government, in reference to the various and diversified 
interests of the community ; and nothing more easy than to pervert its powers into 
instruments to aggrandize and enrich one or more interests by oppressing and impov¬ 
erishing the others; and this too, under the operation of laws, couched in general 
terms;—and which, on their face, appear fair and equal. Nor is this the case in 
some particular communities only. It is so in all ; the small and the great,—the 
poor and the rich.—irrespective of pursuits, productions, or degrees of civilization ;— 
with, however, this difference, that the more extensive and populous the country, the 
more diversified the condition and pursuits of its population, and the richer, more 
luxurious, and dissimilar the people, the more difficult is it to equalize the action of 
the government,—and the more easy for one portion of the community to pervert its 
])()wers to oppress and plunder the other. 

“ Such being the case, it necessarily results that the right of suffrage,by placing 
the control of tbe government in the community must, from the same constitution 
of our nature which makes government necessary to preserve society, lead to conflict 
among its different interests,—each striving to obtain possession of its powers, as the 
means of protecting itself against the others ;—or of advancing its respective inter¬ 
ests, regardless of the interests of others. For this purpose, a struggle will take 
])lace between the various interests to obtain a majority, in order to control the gov¬ 
ernment. If no one interest be strong enough, of itself, to obtain it, a combination 
will be formed between those Avhose interests are most alike;—each conceding some- 
thing to the others, until a sufficient number is obtained to make a majority. The 
process may be slow, and much time may be re(iuired before a compact, organized 
majority can be thus formed; but formed it will be in time, even without preconcert 
or design, by the sure workings of that principle or constitution of our nature in which 
government itself originates. When once formed, the community Avill be divided 
into two great parties,—a major and minor,—between which there will be incessant 
struggles on the one^^ide to retain, and on the other to obtain the majority,—and, 
thereby, the control of the government and the advantages it confers. 

“ So deeply seated, indeed, is this tendency 1o conflict between the different inter¬ 
ests or portions of the community, that it would result from the action of the gov¬ 
ernment itself, even though it Avere possible to find a community, where the people 
Avere all of the same pursuits, placed in the same condition in life, and in every 
respect, so situated, ns to be Avithout inequality of condition or diversity of interests. 
The advantages of possessing the control of the i)OAvers of the government, and, 


8 


thereby, of its honors air] emoluments, are, of themselves, exclusive of all other 
considerations, ample to divide even such a community into two great hostile 
parties. 

“ In order to form a just estimate of the full force of these advantages,—without 
reference to any other consideration,—it must be remembered, that government,— 
to fulfil the ends for which it is ordained, and more especially that of protection 
against external dangers,—must, in the present condition of the world, be clothed 
with powers sufficient to call forth the resources of the community, and be prepared, 
at all times, to command them promptly in every emergency which may possibly 
arise. For this purpose large establishments are necessary, both civil and military, 
(including naval, where, from situation, that description of force may be required,) 
with all the means necessary for prompt and effective action,—such as fortifications, 
fleets, armories, arsenals, magazines, arms of all descriptions, with well-trained 
forces, in sufficient numbers to wield them with skill and energy, whenever the occa¬ 
sion requires it. The administration and management of a government with such 
va.st establishments must necessarily require a host of employees, agents, and officers; 
—of whom many must be vested with high and responsible trusts, and occupy 
exalted stations, accompanied with much influence and patronage. To meet the 
necessary expenses, large sums must be collected and disbursed; and, for this pur¬ 
pose, heavy taxes must be imposed, requiring a multitude of officers for their collec¬ 
tion and disbursement. The whole united must necessarily place under the control 
of government an amount of honors and emoluments, sufficient to excite profoundly 
the ambition of the aspiring and the cupidity of the avaricious ; and to lead to the 
formation of hostile parties, anU violent party conflicts and struggles to obtain the 
control of the government. And what makes this evil remediless, through the right 
of suffrage of itself, however modified or carefully guarded, or however enlightened 
the people, is the fact that, as far as the honors and emoluments of the government 
and its fiscal action are concerned, it is impossible to equalize it. The reason is 
obvious. Its honors and emoluments, however great, can fall to the lot of but a few, 
compared to the entire number of the community, and the multitude who will seek 
to participate in them. But, without this, there is a reason which renders it impos¬ 
sible to equalize the action of the government, so far as its fiscal operation extends, 
—which I sliall next explain. 

“ Few, comparatively, as they are, the agents and employees of the government 
constitute that portion of the community who are the exclusive recipients of the pro¬ 
ceeds of the taxes. Whatever amount is taken from the community, in the form of 
taxes, if not lost, goes to them in the shape of expenditures or disbursements. 'I'he 
two,—disbursement and taxation,—constitute the fiscal action of the government. 
They are correlatives. What the one takes from the community, under the name 
of taxes, is transferred to the portion of the community who are the recipients, under 
that of disbursement.s. But, as the recii)ients constitute only a portion of the com¬ 
munity, it follows, taking the two parts of the fiscal process together, that its action 
must be unequal between the payers of the taxes and the reciifients of their proceeds. 
Nor can it be otherwise, unless what is collected from each individual in the shape 
of taxes, shall be returned to him, in that of disbursements ; which would make the 
process nugatory and absurd. Taxation may, indeed, be made equal, regarded se])a- 
ratelv from disbursement. Even this is no easy task ; but the two united cannot 
possibly be made equal. 

“ Such being the case, it must necessarily follow, that some one portion of the 
community must pay in taxes more than it receives back in disbursements; while 
another receives in disbursements more than it pays in taxes. It is, then, manifest, 
taking the whole ^n-ocess together, that taxes must be, in effect, bounties to that por¬ 
tion of the community which receives more in disbursements than it pays in taxes ; 
while, to the other which pays in taxes more than it receives in disbursements, they 
are taxes in reality,—burthens, instead of bounties. This consequence is unavoid- 


9 


able. It results from tlie nature of the process, be the taxes ever so equally laid, and 
the disbursements ev-?r so fairly made, in reference to the public service. 

“It is assumed, in coming to this conclusion, that the disbursements are made 
within the community. The reasons assigned would not be applicable if the proceeds 
of the taxes were paid in tribute, or expended in foreign countries. In either of 
these cases, the burthen would fall on all, in proportion to the amount of taxes they 
respectively paid. 

“ Nor would it be less a bounty to the portion of the community which received 
back in disbursements more than it paid in taxes, because received as salaiies for 
official services; or payments to persons employed in executing the works requited 
by the government; or furnishing it with its various supplies ; or any other de¬ 
scription of public employment,—instead of being bestowed gratuitously. It is the 
disbursements which give additional, and, usually, very profitable and honorable 
employments to the portion of the community where they are made. But to create 
such employments, by disbursements, is to bestow on the portion of the community 
to whose lot the disbursements may fall, a far more durable and lasting benefit, one 
that would add much more to its wealth and population,—than would the bestowal 
of an equal sum gratuitously: and hence, to the extent that the disbursements exceed 
the taxes, it may be fairly regarded as a bounty. The very reverse is the case in ref. 
erence to the portion which pays in taxes more than it receives in disbursements. 
With them, profitable employments are diminished to the same extent, and popu¬ 
lation and wealth correspondingly decreased. 

“ The necessary result, then, of the unequal fiscal action of the government is, to 
divide the community into two great classes: one consisting of those who, in reality, 
pay the taxes, and, of course, bear exclusively the burthen of supporting the govern¬ 
ment ; and the other, of those who are the recipients of their proceeds, through dis¬ 
bursements, and who are, in fact, supported by the government; or, in fewer words, 
to divide it into tax-payers and tax consumers. 

“But the effect of this is to place them in antagonistic relations, in reference to 
the fiscal action of the government, and the entire course of policy therewith con¬ 
nected. For, the greater the taxes and disbursements, the greater the gain of the one 
and the loss of the other,—and moe verm ; and consequently, the more the policy of 
the government is calculated to increase taxes and disbursements, the more it will be 
favored by the one and opposed by the other. 

“ The effect, then, of every increase is, to enrich and strengthen the one, and 
impoverish aird weaken the other. This, indeed, may be carried to such an extent, 
that one class or ])ortion of the community may be elevated to wealth and power, and 
the other depressed to abject poverty and dependence, simply by the fiscal action of 
the government; and this too, through disbursements only,—even under a system of 
equal taxes imposed for revenue only. If such may be the effect of taxes and disburse¬ 
ments, when confined to their legitimate objects,—that of raising revenue for the 
public service,—some conception may be formed, how one portion of the community 
may be crushed, and another elevated on its ruins, by systematically perverting the 
power of taxation and disbursement, for the purpose of aggrandizing and building 
up one portion of the community at the expense of the other. That it icill be so used, 
unless prevented, is, from the constitution of man, just as certain as that it can be' 
so used; and that, if not prevented, it must give rise to two parties, and to violent 
conflicts and struggles between them, to obtain the control of the government, is, for 
the same reason, not less certain. 

“Nor is it less certain, from the operation of all these causes, that the dominant 
majority, for the time, would have the same tendency to oppression and abuse of 
power, which, without the right of suffrage, irresponsible rulers would have. No 
reason, indeed, can be assigned, why the latter would abuse their power, which 
would not apply, with equal force, to the former. The dominant majority, for the 
time, would, in reality, through the right of suffrage, be the rulers—the controlling, 


10 


governing, and irresponsible power; and those who make and execute the laws 
would, for the time, be, in reality, but tlinr representatives and agents. 

“ Nor would the fact that the former would constitute a majority of the commu¬ 
nity, counteract a tendency originating in the constitution of man ; and which, as 
such, cannot depend on the number by wliom the powers of the government may be 
wielded. Be it greater or smaller, a majority or minority, it must equally partake of 
an attribute inherent in each individual composing it; and, as in each the individual 
is stronger than the social feelings, the one would have the same tendency as the 
other to oppression and abuse of power. The reason applies to government in all its 
forms,—whether it be that of the one, the few, or the many. In each there must, 
of necessity, be a governing and governed,—a ruling and a subject portion. The '' 
one implies the other; and in all, the two bear the same relation to each other ;—and 
have, on the part of the governing portion, the same tendency to oppression and 
abuse of poNver. Where the majority is that portion, it matters not how its powers 
may be exercised ;—whether directly by themselves, or indirectly, through represen¬ 
tatives or agents. \Be it which it may, the minority, for the time, will be as much the 
governed or subject portion, as are the people in an aristocracy, or the subjects in a 
monarchy. The only difference in this respect is, that in the government of a ma¬ 
jority, the minority may become the majority, and the majority the minority, through 
the right of suffrage ; and thereby change their relative positions, without the inter- 
ventfon of force and revolution. But the duration, or uncertainty of the tenure, by 
which power is held, cannot, of itself, counteract the tendency inherent in govern¬ 
ment to oppression and abuse of power. On the contrary, the very uncertainty of 
the tenure, combined with the violent party warfare which must ever precede a change 
of party under such governments, would I’ather tend to increase than diminish the 
tendency to oppression. 

“ As, then, the right of suffrage, without some other provision, cannot counteract 
this tendency of government, the next question for consideration is—What is that 
other provision ? This demands the most serious consideration; for of all the ques¬ 
tions embraced in the science of government, it involves a principle, the most im¬ 
portant, and the least understood ; and when understood, the most difficult of appli¬ 
cation in ])ractice. It is, indeed, emphatically, that principle which makes the con¬ 
stitution, in its strict and limited sense. 

“ From what has been said, it is manifest, that this provision must be of a char¬ 
acter calculated to prevent any one interest, or combination of interests, from using 
the powers of government to aggrandize itself at the expense of the others. Here 
lies the evil : and just in proportion as it shall prevent, or fail to prevent it, in the 
same degree it will effect, or fail to effect the end intended to be accomplished. There 
is but one certain mode in which this result can be secured ; and that is, by the adop¬ 
tion of some restriction or limitation, which shall so effectually prevent any one 
interest, or combination of interests, from obtaining the exclusive control of the 
government, as to render hopeless all attempts directed to that end. There is, again, 
but one mode in which this can be effected ; and that is, by taking the sense of each 
interest or portion of the community, which may be unequally and injuriously affected 
by the action of the government, separately, through its own majority, or in some 
other way by which its voice may be fairly expressed ; and to require the consent of 
each interest, either to put or to keep the government in action. This, too, can be 
accomplished only in one way,—and that is, by such an organism of the government,— 
and, if necessary for the purpose, of the community also.—as will, by dividing and 
distributing the powers of government, give to each division or interest, through its 
appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws, or a 
veto on their execution. It is only by such an organism, that the assent of each can 
be made necessary to put the government in motion ; or the power made effectual to 
arrest its action, when put in motion ;—and it is only by the one or the other that the 
different interests, orders, classes, or portions, into which the community may be 


11 


divided, can be protected, and all conflict and struggle between tliem prevented,—by 
rendering it impossible to put or to keep it in action, without the concurrent consent 
of all. 

“ Such an organism as this, combined with the right of suffrage, constitutes, in 
fact, the elements of constitutional government. The one, by rendering those who 
make and execute the laws responsible lo those on whom they operate, prevents the 
rulers from oppressing the ruled ; and the other, by making it impossible for anyone 
interest or combination of interests or class, or order, or portion of the community, 
to obtain exclusive control, prevents any one of them from op]>ressing the other. It 
is (dear, that oppression and abuse of power must come, if at all, from the one or the 
other quarter. From no other can they come. It follows, tliat the two, suffrage and 
proper organism combined, are sufficient to counteract the tendency of government 
to oppression and abuse of power ; and to restrict it to the fulfilment of the great 
ends for which it is ordained. 

“ In coming to this conclusion, I have assumed the organism to be perfect, and 
the different interests, portions, or classes of tlie community, to be sufficiently 
enlightened to understand its character and object, and to exercise, with due intelli¬ 
gence, the right of suffrage. To the extent that either may be defective, to the same 
extent the government would fall short of fulfilling its end. But this does not 
impeach the truth of the princi]>les on wliich it rests. In reducing them to proper 
form, in applying them to practical uses, all elementary principles are liable to diffi¬ 
culties; but tliey are not, on this account, the less true, or valuable. Where the 
organism is perfect, every interest will be truly and fully represented, and of course 
the whole community must be so. It may be difficult, or even impossible, to make 
a 'perfect organism,—but, although this be true, yet even when, instead of the sense 
of each and of all, it takes that of a few great and prominent interests only, it 
Avould still, in a great measure, if not altogether, fulfil the end intended by a consti¬ 
tution. For, in such case, it would require so large a portion of the community, com- 
])ared with the whole, to concur, or acquiesce in the action of the government, that 
the number to be plundered would be too few. and the number to be aggrandized too 
many, to afford adequate motives to oppression and the abuse of its powers. Indeed, 
howev^er imperfect the organism, it must have more or less effect in diminishing such 
tendency. 

“ It may be readily inferred, from what has been stated, that the effect of organ¬ 
ism is neither to supersede nor diminish the importance of the right of suffrage ; but 
to aid and perfect it. The object of the latter is, to collect the sense of the commu¬ 
nity. The more fully and perfectly it accomplishes this, the more fully and per¬ 
fectly it fulfils its end. But the most it can do, of itself, is to collect the sense of the 
greater number ; that is, of the stronger interests, or combination of interests ; and 
to assume this to be the sense of the community. It is only when aided by a proper 
organism, that it can collect the sense of the entire community,—of each and all its 
interests ; of each, through its appropriate organ, and of the whole, through all of 
them united. This would truly be the sense of the entire community ; for whatever 
diversity each interest might have within itself,—as all would have the same interest 
in reference to the action of the government, the individuals composing eacli, would 
be fully and truly represented by its own majority or appropriate organ, regarded in 
reference to the other interests. In brief, every individual of every interest might 
trust with confidence, its majority or appropriate organ, against that of every other 
interest. 

“ It results, from what has been said, that there are two different modes in which 
the sense of the community may be taken ; one, simply by the right of suffrao-e 
unaided ; the other, by the right through a proper organism. Each collects the 
sense of the majority. But one regards numbers only, and considers the wliole com¬ 
munity as a unit, having but one common interest throughout; and collects tlie 
sense of the greater nnmber of the whole, as that of the community. The other on 


12 


the contrury, rc'^fards interests as well us numbers;—considering the community as 
made up of dilTerenr and conflicting interests, as far as the action of the government 
is concerned ; and takes the sense of each, through its majority or appropriate organ, 
and the united sense of all, as the sense of the entire community. The former of 
these I shall call the numerical, or absolute majority ; and the latter, the concurrent, 
or constitutional majority. I call it the constitutional majority, because it is an 
essential element in every constitutional government,—be its form what it may. So 
great is the difference, politically speaking, between the two majorities, that they 
cannot be confounded, without leading to great and fatal errors; and yet the distinc¬ 
tion between them has been so entirely overlooked, that when the term majority is 
used in political discussions, it is applied exclusively to designate the nunierical,--as 
if there were no other. Until this distinction is recognized, and better understood, 
there will continue to be great liability to error in properly constructing constitu¬ 
tional governments, especially of the popular form, and of preserving them 'when 
properly constructed. Until then, the latter will have a strong tendency to slide, 
first, into the government of the numerical majority, and, finally, into absolute 
government of some other form. To show that such must be the case, and at the 
same time to mark more strongly the difference between the two, in order to guard 
against the danger of overlooking it, I proi)ose to consider the subject more at 
length. 

“ The first and leading error which naturally arises from overlooking the distinc¬ 
tion referred to, is, to confound the numerical majority with the people ; and this so 
completely as to regard them as identical. This is a consequence that necessarily 
results from considering the numerical as the only majority. All admit, that a popu¬ 
lar government, or democracy, is the government of the people ; for the terms imply 
this, A perfect government of the kind would be one which would embrace the con¬ 
sent of every citizen or member of the community; but as this is impracticable, 
those who regard the numerical as the only majority, and who can perceive no other 
way by which the sense of the people can be taken, are compelled to adopt this as 
the only true basis of popular government, in contradistinction to governments of the 
aristocratical or monarchical form. Being thus constrained, they are, in the next 
place, forced to regard the numerical majority, as, in effect, the entire people ; that 
is, the greater part as the whole ; and the government of the greater part as the 
government of the whole. It is thus the two come to be confounded, and a part 
made identical with the whole. And it is thus, also, that all the rights, powers, and 
immunities of the whole people come to be attributed to the numerical majority ; 
and, among others, the supreme, sovereign authority of establishing and abolishing 
governments at pleasure. 

“ This radical error, the consequence of confounding the two, and of regarding 
the numerical as the only majority, has contributed more than any other cause, to 
prevent the formation of popular constitutional governments,—and to destroy them 
even when they hav’e been formed. It leads to the conclusion that, in their forma¬ 
tion and establishment, nothing more is necessary than the right of suffrage,—and 
the allotment to each division of the community a representation in the government, 
in proportion to numbers. If the numerical majority were really the people ; and if, 
to take its sense truly, were to take the sense of the people truly, a government so 
constituted would be a true and perfect model of a popular constitutional govern¬ 
ment ; and every departure from it would detract from its excellence. But, as such 
is not the case,—as the numerical majority, instead of being the people, is only a 
portion of them,—such a governmeut, instead of being a true and perfect model of 
the people’s government, that is, a people self-governed, is but the government of a 
part, over a part,—the major over the minor portion. 

“ But this misconception of the true elements of constitutional government does 
not stop here. It leads to others equally false and fatal, in reference to the best 
means of preserving and perpetuating them, when, from some fortunate combination 


13 


of circumstances, they are correctly formed. For they who fall into these errors 
regard the restrictions which organism imposes on the will of the numerical majority 
as restrictions on the will of the people, and, therefore, as not only useless, but 
wrongful and mischievous. And hence they endeavor to destroy organism, under 
the delusive hope of making gov’^ernment more democratic. 

“ Such are some of the consequences of confounding the two, and of regarding 
the numerical as the only majority. And in this may be found the reason why so 
few popular governments have been properly constructed, and why, of these few, 
so small a number have proved durable. Such must continue to be the result, so 
long as these errors continue to be prevalent. 

“ There is another error, of a kindred character, whose influence contributes mncn 
to the same results: I refer to the prevalent opinion, that a written constitution, 
containing suitable restrictions on the powers of government, is sufficient, of itself, 
without the aid of any organism,—except such as is necessary to sejmrate its several 
departments, and render them independent of each other,—to counteract the ten¬ 
dency of the numerical majority to oppression and the abuse of power. 

“ A written constitution certainly has many and considerable advantages ; but it 
is a great mistake to suppose, that the mere insertion of provisions to restrict and 
limit the powers of the government, without investing those for Avhose protection 
they are inserted with the means of enforcing their observance, will be sufficient to 
prevent the major and dominant party from abusing its powers. Being the party in 
possession of the government, they will, from the same constitution of man which 
makes government necessary to protect society, be in favor of the powers granted by 
the constitution, and opposed to the restrictions intended to limit them. As the 
major and dominant party, they will have no need of these restrictions for their pro¬ 
tection. The ballot-box, of itself, would be ample protection to them. Needing no 
other, they would come, in time, to regard these limitations as unnecessary and im¬ 
proper restraints ;—and endeavor to elude them, with the view of increasing their 
power and influence. 

“ The minor, or weaker party, on the contrary, would take the opposite direction ; 
—and regard them as essential to their protection against the dominant ])arty. And, 
hence, they would endeavor to defend and enlarge the restrictions, and to limit and 
contract the powers. But where there are no means by which they could compel 
the major party to observe the restrictions, the only resort left them would be, a 
strict construction of the constitution,—that is, a construction which would confine 
these powers to the narrowest limits which the meaning of the words used in the 
grant would admit. 

“To this the major party would oppose a liberal construction,—one which would 
give the words of the grant the broadest meaning of which they were susceptible. 
It would then be construction against construction ; the one to contract, and the other 
to enlarge the powers of the government to the utmost. But of what possible avail 
could the Strict construction of the minor party be, against the liberal interpretation 
of the major, when the one would have all the powers of the government to carry 
its construction into effect,—and the other be deprived of all means of enforcing its 
construction ? In a contest so unequal, the result would not be cfoubtful. The party 
in favor of the restrictions would be overpowered. At first, they might command 
some respect, and do something to stay the march of encroachment ; but they would, 
in the progress of the contest, be regarded as mere abstractionists ; and, indeed, de¬ 
servedly, if they should indulge the folly of supposing that the party in possession 
of the ballot-box and the physical force of the country, could be successfully resisted 
by an appeal to reason, truth, justice, or the obligations im])osed by the constitution. 
For when these, of themselves, shall exert sufficient influence to stay the hand of 
power, then government will be no longer necessary to protect society, nor constitu¬ 
tions needed to prevent govermnent from abusing its powers. The end of the contest 
would be the subversion of the constitution, either by the undermining process of 


14 


construction,—where its meaning would admit of possible doubt,—or by substituting 
in practice what is called party-usage, in place of its provisions ;—or, finally, wh^n 
no other contrivance would subserve the purpose, by openly and boldly setting them 
aside. By the one or the other, the restrictions would ultimately be annulled, and 
the government be converted into one of unlimited powers. 

“ Nor would the division of government into separate, and, as it regards each 
other, independent departments, prevent this result. Such a division may do much 
to facilitate its operations, and to secure to its administration greater caution and de¬ 
liberation ; but as each and all the departments,—and, of course, the entire govern¬ 
ment,—would be under the control of the numerical majority, it is too clear to re¬ 
quire explanation, that a mere distribution of its powers among its agents or repre¬ 
sentatives, could do little or nothing to counteract its tendency to oppression and 
abuse of power. To effect this, it would be necessary to go one step further, and 
make the several departments the organs of the distinct interests or portions of tlie 
community ; and to clothe each with a negative on the others. But the effect of this 
would be to change the government from the numerical into the concurrent majority. 

“ Having now explained the reasons why it is so difficult to form and preserve 
popular constitutional government, so long as the distinction between the two major¬ 
ities is overlooked, and the opinion prevails that a written constitution, with suitable 
restrictions and a proper division of its powers, is sufficient to counteract the tendency 
of the numerical majority to the abuse of its power,—I shall next proceed to explain, 
more fully, why the concurrent majority is an indispensable element in forming con¬ 
stitutional governments ; and why the numerical majority, of itself, must, in all 
cases, make governments absolute. 

“ The necessary consequence of taking the sense of the community by the con¬ 
current majority is, as has been explained, to give to each interest or portion of the 
community a negative on the others. It is this mutual negative among its various 
conflicting interests, which invests each with the power of protecting itself ;—and 
places the rights and safety of each, where only they can be securely placed, under 
its own guardianship. Without this there can be no systematic, peaceful, or effec¬ 
tive resistance to the natural tendency of each to come into conflict with the others : 
and without this there can be no constitution. It is this negative power,—the power 
of preventing or arresting the action of the government,—be it called by what term 
it may,—veto, check, or balance of power,—which, in fact, forms the constitution. 
They are all but different names for the negative power. In all its forms, and under 
all its names, it results from the concurrent majority. Without this there can be no 
negative ; and, without a negative, no constitution. The assertion is true in refer¬ 
ence to all constitutional governments, be their forms what they may. It is, indeed, 
the negative power which makes the constitution,—and the positive which makes the 
government. The one is the power of acting;—and the other the power of prevent¬ 
ing or arresting action. The two, combined, make constitutional governments. 

" But, as there can be no constitution without the negative power, and no nega¬ 
tive power without the concurrent majority ;—it follows necessarily that where the 
numerical majority has the sole control of the government, there c^n be no constitu¬ 
tion ; as constitution implies limitation or restriction,—and, of course, is inconsistent 
with the idea of sole or exclusive power. And hence, the numerical, unmixed with 
the concurrent majority, necessarily forms, in all cases, absolute government. 

“ It is, indeed, the single, or one poioer, which excludes the negative, and consti¬ 
tutes absolute government; and not the number in whom the power is vested. The 
numerical majority is as truly a single power, and excludes the negative as completely 
as the absolute government of one, or of the few. The former is as much the abso¬ 
lute government of the democratic, or popular form, as the latter of the monarchical 
or aristocratical. It has, accordingly, in common with them, the same tendency to 
oppression and abuse of power. 

“ Constitutional governments, of whatever form, are, indeed, much more similar 


to eacli otlier, in tlioir structure and clmracter, than they are, resi)ectively, to the 
absolute governments, even of their own class. All constitutional governments, of 
whatever class they may be, take the sense of the community by its parts,—each 
through its appropriate organ ; and regard the sense of all its parts, as the sense of 
the whole. They all rest on the right of sulfrage, and the responsibility of rulers, 
directly or indirectly. On the contrary, all absolute governments, of whatever form, 
concentrate power in one uncontrolled and irresponsible individual or body, whose 
will is regarded as the sense of the community. And, hence, the great and broad 
distinction between governments is,—not that of the one, the few, or the many,— 
but of the constitutional and the absolute. 

‘‘ From this there results another distinction, wdiich, although secondary in its 
character, very strongly marks the difference between these forms of government. 
I refer to their respective conservative principle ;—that is, the principle by which 
they are upheld and preserved. This principle, in constitutional governments, is 
comjjTomise ;—and in absolute governments, is force /—as will be next explained. 

“ It has been already shown, that the same constitution of man which leads those 
who govern to oppress the governed,—if not prevented,—will, with equal force and 
certainty, lead the latter to resist oppression, when possessed of the means of doing 
so peaceably and successfully. But absolute governments, of all forms, exclude all 
other means of resistance to their authority, than that of force ; and, of course, leave 
no other alternative to the governed, but to acquiesce in oppression, however great 
it maybe, or to resort to force to put down the government. But the dread of such 
a resoA must necessarily lead the government to prepare to meet force in order to 
protect itself ; and hence, of necessity, force becomes the conservative principle of all 
such governments. 

“ On the contrary, the government of the concurrent majority, where the organism 
is perfect, excludes the possibility of oppression, by giving to each interest, or 
portion, or order,—where there are established classes,—the means of protecting 
itself, by its negative, against all measures calculated to advance the peculiar interests 
of others at its expense. Its effect, then, is, to cause the different interests, portions, 
or orders,—as the case may be,—to desist from attempting- to adopt any measure cal¬ 
culated to promote the prosperity of one, or more, by sacrificing that of others ; and 
thus to force them to unite in such measures only as would promote the prosperity 
of all, as the only means to prevent the suspension of the action of the government; 
—and, thereby, to avoid anarchy, the greatest of all evils. It is by means of such 
autliorized and effectual resistance, that oppression is prevented, and the necessity of 
resorting to force superseded, in governments of the concurrent majority ;—and, 
hence, compromise, instead of force, becomes their conservative principle. 

“ It would, perhaps, be more strictly correct to trace the conservative principle of 
constitutional governments to the necessity which compels the different interests, or 
portions, or orders, to compromise,—as the only way to promote their respective 
prosperity, and to avoid anarchy,—rather than to the compromise itself. No necessity 
can be more urgent and imperious, than that of avoiding anarchy. It is the same as 
that which makes government indispensable to preserve society ; and is not less 
imperative than that which compels obedience to superior force. Traced tc :his 
source, the voice of a people,—uttered under the necessity of avoiding the greatest 
of calamities, through the organs of a government so constructed as to suppress the 
expression of all partial and selfish interests, and to give a full and faithful utterance 
to the sense of the whole community, in reference to its common welfare,—may, 
without impiety, be called the voice of God. To call any other so, would be impious. 

“ In stating that force is the conservative principle of absolute, and compromise 
of constitutional governments, I have assumed both to be perfect in their kind - but 
not without bearing in mind, that few or none, in fact, have ever been so absolute as 
not to be under some restraint, and none so perfectly organized as to represent fully 
and perfectly the voice of the whole community. Such being the case, all must, in 


16 


practice, depart more or less from tlie principles by wliicli they are respect.vely 
upheld and preserved ; and depend more or less for support, on force, or compromise, 
as the absolute or the constitutional form predominates in their respective organiza¬ 
tions. 

“ Nor, in stating that absolute governments exclude all other means of resistance 
to its authority than that of force, have I overlooked the case of governments of the 
numerical majority, which form, apparently, an exception. It is true that, in such 
governments, the minor and subject party, for the time, have the right to oppose and 
resist the major and dominant party, for the time, through the ballot-box; and may 
turn them out, and take their place, if they can obtain a majority of votes. But, it 
is no less true, that this would be a mere change in the relations of the two parties. 
The minor and subject party would become the major and dominant party, with the 
same absolute authority and tendency to abuse jtower ; and the major and dominant 
party would become the minor and subject party, with the same right to resist 
through the ballot-box ; and, if successful, again to change relations, with like effect. 
But such a state of things must necessarily be temporary. The conflict between the 
two parties must be transferred, sooner or later, from an appeal to the ballot-box to 
an appeal to force ;—as I shall next proceed to explain. 

“ The conflict between the two parties, in the government of the numerical 
majority, tends necessarily to settle down into a struggle for the honors and emolu¬ 
ments of the government; and each, in order to obtain an object so ardently desired, 
will, in the process of the struggle, resort to whatever measure may seem best cal¬ 
culated to effect this purpose. The adoption, by the one, of any measure, however 
objectionable, which might give it an advantage, would compel the other to follow its 
example. In such case, it would be indispensable to success to avoid division and keej) 
united ;—and hence, from a necessity inherent in the nature of such governments, each 
party must be alternately forced, in order to insure victory, to resort to measures to 
concentrate the control over its movements in fewer and fewer hands, as the struggle 
became more and more violent. This, in process of time, must lead to party organiza¬ 
tion, and party caucuses and discipline ; and these, to the conversion of the honors and 
emoluments of the government into means of rewarding partisan services, in order 
to secure the fidelity and increase the zeal of the members of the party. The effect 
of the whole combined, even in the earlier stages of the process, when they exert the 
least pernicious influence, would be to place the control of the two ])arties in the 
hands of their respective majorities; and the government itself, virtually, under the 
control of the majority of the dominant party, for the time, instead of the majority of 
the whole community ;—where the theory of this form of government vests it. Thus, 
in the very first stage of the process, the government becomes the government of a 
minority instead of a majority ;—a minority, usually, and under the most favorable 
circumstances, of not much more than one-fourth of the whole community. 

“But the process, as regards the concentration of power, would not stop at this 
stage. The government would gradually pass from the hands of the majority of the 
party into those of its leaders ; as the struggle became more intense, and the honors 
and emoluments of the government the all-absorbing objects. At this stage, principles 
and policy would lose all influence in the elections ; and cunning, falsehood, decep¬ 
tion, slander, fraud, and gross appeals to the appetites of the lowest and most worth¬ 
less portions of the community, would take the place of sound reason and wise debate. 
After these have thoroughly debased and corrupted the community, and all the arts 
and devices of party have been exhausted, the government would vibrate between 
the two factions (for such will parties have become) at each successive election. 
Neither would be able to retain power beyond some fixed term ; for those seeking 
office and patronage would become too numerous to be rewarded by the offices and 
patronage at the disposal of the government; and these being the sole objects of 
pursuit, the disappointed would, at the next succeeding election, throw tlieir weight 
into the opposite scale, in the hope of better success at the next turn of the wheel. 


17 


These vibrations would continue until confusion, corruption, disorder, and anarchy, 
would lead to an appeal to force;—to be followed by a revolution in the form of 
the government. Such must be the end of the government of the numerical majority ; 
and such, in brief, the process through which it must pass, in the regular course of 
events, before it can reach it. 

“ This transition would be more or less rapid, according to circumstances. The 
more numerous the population, the more extensive the country, the more diversified 
the climate, productions, pursuits and character of the people, the more wealthy, 
refined, and artificial their condition,—and the greater the amount of revenues and 
disbursements,—the more unsuited would the community be to such a government, 
and the more rapid would be the passage. On the other hand, it might be slow in 
its progress amongst small communities, during the early stages of their existence, 
with inconsiderable revenues and disbursenients, and a population of simple habits; 
provided the people are sufficiently inttdligent to exercise properly, the right of 
suffrage, and sufficiently conversant with the rules necessary to govern the delibera¬ 
tions of legislative bodies. It is, perhaps, the only form of popular government 
suited to a people, while they remain in such a condition. Any other would be not 
only too complex and cumbersome, but unnecessary to guard against oppression, 
where the motive to use power for that purpose would be so feeble. And hence, 
colonies, from countries having constitutional governments, if left to themselves, 
usually adopt governments based on the numerical majority. But as population 
increases, wealth accumulates, and, above all, the revenues and expenditures become 
large,—governments of this form must become less and less suited to the condition of 
society ; until, if not in the mean time changed into governments of the concurrent 
majority, they must end in an appeal to force, to be followed by a radical change in 
its structure and character; and, most probably, into monarchy in its absolute form, 
—as will be next explained. 

“ Such, indeed, is the repugnance between popular governments and force,—or, 
to be more gpecific,—military power,—that the almost necessary consequence of a 
resort to force, by such governments, in order to maintain their authority, is, not 
only a change of their form, but a change into the most opposite,—that of absolute 
monarchy. The two are the opposites of each other. From the nature of popular 
governments, the control of its powers is vested in the many ; while military power, 
to be efficient, must be vested In a single individual. When, then, the two parties, 
in governments of the numerical majority, resort to force, in their struggle for 
supremacy, he who commands the successful party will have the control of the 
government itself. And, hence, in such contests, the party which may prevail, will 
usually find, in the commander of its forces, a master, under whom the great body 
of the community will be glad to find protection against the incessant agitation and 
violent struggles of two corrupt factions,—looking only to power as the means of 
securing to themselves the honors and emoluments of the government. 

“ From the same cause, there is a like tendency in aristocratical to terminate in 
absolute governments of the monarchical form ; but by no means as strong, because 
there is less repugnance between military power and aristocratical, than between it 
and democratical governments. * 

“ A broader position may, indeed, be taken ; viz., that there is a tendency, in con¬ 
stitutional governments of every form, to degenerate into their respective absolute 
forms ; and, in all absolute governments, into that of the monarchical form. But the 
tendency is much stronger in constitutional governments of the democratic form 
to degenerate into their respective absolute forms, than in either of the others * 
because, among other reasons, the distinction between the constitutional and absolute 
forms of aristocratical and monarchical governments, is far more strongly marked 
than in democratic governments. The effect of this is, to make the different orders 
or classes in an aristocracy, or monarchy, far more jealous and watchful of encroach¬ 
ment on their respective rights ; and more resolute and persevering in resisting 




18 


attempts to concentrate power in any one class or order. On the contrary, the line 
between the two forms, in popular governments, is so imperfectly understood, that 
honest and sincere friends of the constitutional form not unfrequently, instead of 
jealously watching and arresting their tendency to degenerate into their absolute 
forms, not only regard it with approbation, but employ all their powers to add to 
its strength and to increase its impetus, in the vain hope of making the government 
more perfect and popular. The numerical majority, perhaps, should usually be one 
of the elements of a constitutional democracy ; but to make it the sole element, in 
order to perfect the constitution and make the government more popular, is one of 
the greatest and most fatal of political errors. 

“ Among the other advantages which governments of the concurrent have over 
those of the numerical majority,—and which strongly illustrates their more popular 
character, is,—that they admit, with safety, a much greater extension of the right of 
suffrage. It may be safely extended in such governments to universal suffrage : that 
is, to every male citizen of mature age, with few ordinary exceptions ; but it cannot 
be so far extended in those of the numerical majority, without placing them ulti¬ 
mately under the control of the more ignorant and dependent portions of the com¬ 
munity, For, as the community becomes populous, wealthy, refined, and highly 
civilized, the difference between the rich and the poor will become more strongly 
marked; and the number of the ignorant and dependent greater in proportion to the 
rest of the community. With the increase of this difference, tendency to conflict 
between them will become stronger; and,-as the poor and dependent become more 
numerous in proportion, there Avill be, in governments of the numerical majority, no 
want of leaders among the wealthy and ambitious, to excite and direct them in their 
efforts to obtain the control. 

“ The case is different in governments of the concurrent majority. There, mere 
numbers have not the absolute control; and the wealthy and intelligent being 
identified in interest with the poor and ignorant of their respective portions or 
interests of the community, become their leaders and protectors. And hence, as the 
latter would have neither hope nor inducement to rally the former in order to obtain 
the control, the right of suffrage, under such a government, may be safely enlarged 
to the extent stated, without incurring the hazard to which such enlargement would 
expose governments of the numerical majority. 

“ In another particular, governments of the concurrent majority have greatly 
the advantage. I allude to the difference in their respective tendency, in reference 
to dividing or uniting the community. That of the concurrent, as has been shown, 
is to unite the community, let its interests be ever so diversified or opposed ; while 
that of the numerical is to divide it into two conflicting portions, let its interests be, 
naturally, ever so united and identified. 

“ That the numerical majority will divide the community, let it be ever so homo¬ 
geneous, into two great parties, which will be engaged in perpetual struggles to 
obtain the control of the government, has already been established. The great 
importance of the object at stake, must necessarily form strong party attachments 
and party antipathies ;—attachments on the part of the members of each to their 
respective parties, through whose efforts they hope to accomplish an object dear to 
all; and antipathies to the opjDOsite party, as presenting the only obstacle to success. 

“ In order to have a just conception of their force, it must be taken into consid¬ 
eration, that the object to be won or lost appeals to the strongest passions of the 
human heart,—avarice, ambition, and rivalry. It is not then wonderful, that a form 
of government, which periodically stakes all its honors and emoluments, as prizes to 
be contended for, should divide the community into two great hostile parties ; or 
that party attachments, in the progress of the strife, should become so strong among 
the members of each respectively, as to absorb almost every feeling of our nature, 
both social and individual ; or that their mutual antipathies should be carried to such 
an excess as to destroy, almost entirely, all sympathy between them, and to substi- 


19 


tute in its place the strongest aversion. Nor is it surprising, that under their joint 
influence, the cominunity should cease to he the common centre of attachment, or 
that each party should find that centre only in itself. It is thus, that, in such gov¬ 
ernments, devotion to party becomes stronger than devotion to country ; the promo¬ 
tion of the interests of party more important than the promotion of the common 
good of the whole, and its triumph and ascendency, objects of far greater solicitude 
than the safety and prosperity of the community. It is thus, also, that the numer¬ 
ical majority, by regarding the community as a unit, and having, as such, the same 
interests throughout all its parts, must, by its necessary operation, divide it into two 
hostile parties, waging, under the forms of law, incessant hostilities against each 
other. 

“ The concurrent majority, on the other hand, tends to unite the most opposite 
and conflicting interests, and to blend the whole in one common attachment to the 
country. By giving to each interest, or portion, the power of self-protection, all 
strife and struggle between them for ascendency, is prevented ; and, thereby, not 
only every feeling calculated to weaken the attachment to the whole is suppressed, 
but the individual and the social feelings are made to unite in one common devotion 
to country. Each sees and feels that it can best promote its own prosperity by 
conciliating the good-will, and promoting the prosperity of the others. And hence, 
there Avill be diffused throughout the whole community kind feelings between its 
different portions ; and, instead of antipathy, a rivalry amongst them to promote the 
interests of each other, as far as this can be done consistently with the interest of 
all. Under the combined influence of these causes, the interests of each would be 
merged in the common interests of the whole ; and thus, the community would 
become a unit, by becoming the common centre of attachment of all its parts. And 
hence, instead of faction, strife, and struggle for party ascendency, there would be 
patriotism, nationality, harmony, and a struggle only for supremacy in promoting 
the common good of the whole. 

“ But the difference in their operation, in this respect, would not end here. Its 
effects would be as great in a moral, as I have attempted to show they would be in a 
political point of view. Indeed, public and private morals are so nearly allied, that 
it would be difficult for it to be otherwise. That which corrupts and debases the 
community, politically, must also corrupt and debase it morally. The same cause, 
which, in governments of the numerical majority, gives to party attachments and 
antipathies such force, as to place i^arty triumph and ascendency above the safety 
and prosperity of the community, will just as certainly give them sufficient force to 
overpower all regard for truth, justice, sincerity, and moral obligations of every 
description. It is, accordingly, found that, in the violent strifes between parties for 
the high and glittering prize of governmental honors and emoluments,—falsehood, 
injustice, fraud, artifice, slander, and breach of faith, are freely resorted to, as legi¬ 
timate weapons ;—followed by all their corrupting and debasing influences. 

“ In the government of the concurrent majority, on the contrary, the same cause 
which prevents such strife, as the means of obtaining power, and which makes it the 
inte!rest of each portion to conciliate and promote the interests of# the others, would 
exert a powerful influence towards purifying and elevating the character of the gov¬ 
ernment and the people morally as well as politically. The means of acquiring 
power,—or, more correctly, influence,—in such governments, would be the reverse. 
Instead of the vices, by which it is acquired in that of the numerical majority, the 
opposite virtues—truth, justice, integrity, fidelity, and all others, by which respect 
and confidence are inspired, would be the most certain and effectual means of acquir¬ 
ing it. 

“ Nor would the good effects resulting thence be confined to those who take an 
active part in political affairs. They would extend to the whole communitv. For 
of all the causes which contribute to form the character of a people, those by which 
power, influence, and standing in the government are most certainly and readily 



20 


obtained, are, by far, tlie most powerful. These are the objects most eagerly sought 
of all others by the talented and aspiring; and the possession of which commands the 
greatest respect and admimtion. But, just in proportion to this respect and admira¬ 
tion will be their appreciation by those, whose energy, intellect, and position in 
society, are calculated to exert the greatest influence in forming the character of a 
people. If knowledge, wisdom, patriotism, and virtue be the most certain means of 
acquiring them, they will be most liighly appreciated and assiduously cultivated ; 
and this would cause them to become prominent traits in the character of the people. 
But if, on the contrary, cunning, fraud, treachery, and party devotion be the most 
certain, they will be the most highly prized, and become marked features in their 
character. So powerful, indeed, is the operation of the concurrent majority, in this 
respect, that, if it were possible for a corrupt and degenerate community to establisli 
and maintain a well-organized government of the kind, it would of itself purify and 
regenerate them ; while, on the other hand, a government based wholly on the 
numerical majority, would just as certainly corrupt and debase the most patriotic and 
virtuous people. So great is their difterence in this respect, that, just as the one or 
the other element predominates in the construction of any government, in the same 
proportion will the character of the government and the people rise or sink in the 
scale of patriotism and virtue. Neither religion nor education can counteract the 
strong tendency of the numerical majority to corrupt and debase the people. 

“If the two be compared, in reference to the ends for which government is 
ordained, the superiority of the government of the concurrent majority will not be 
less striking These, as has been stated, are twofold ; to protect, and to perfect 
society. But to preserve society, it is necessary to guard the community against 
injustice, violence, and anarchy within, and against attacks from without. If it fail 
in either, it w^ould fail in the primary end of government, and would not deserve the 
name. 

“ To perfect society, it i« necessary to develop the faculties, intellectual and 
moral, with which man is endowed. But the main spring to their development, and, 
through this, to progress, improvement and civilization, with all their blessings, is 
the desire of individuals to better their condition. For this purpose, liberty and 
security are indispensable. Liberty leaves each free to pursue the course he may 
deem best to promote his interest and happiness, as far as it may be compatible with 
the primary end for which government is ordained ;—while security gives assurance 
to each, that he shall not be deprived of the fruits of his exertions to better his con¬ 
dition. These combined give to this desire the strongest impulse of wdiich it is 
susceptible. For, to extend liberty beyond the limits assigned, would be to weaken 
the government and to render it incompetent to fulfil its primary end,—the protec¬ 
tion of society against dangers internal and external. The effect of this would be, 
insecurity ; and, of insecurity,—to weaken the impulse of individuals to better their 
condition, and thereby retard progress and improvement. On the other hand, to 
extend the powers of the government, so as to contract the sphere assigned to liberty, 
would have the same effect by disabling individuals in their efforts to better their 
condition. 

“ Herein is to be found the principle which assigns to power and liberty their 
proper spheres, and reconciles each to the other under all circumstances. For, if 
powder be necessary to secure to liberty the fruits of its exertions, liberty, in turn, 
repays power wflth interest, by increased population, w^ealth, and other advantages, 
wdiich progress and improvement bestow on the community. By thus assigning to 
each its appropriate sphere, all conflicts between them cease ; and each is made to 
co-operate with, and assist the other, in fulfilling the great ends for which govern¬ 
ment is ordained. 

“ But the principle, applied to different communities, will assign to them different 
limits. It will assign a larger sphere to power and a more contracted one to lib¬ 
erty, or the reverse, according to circumstances. To tlie former, there must ever be 


21 


allotted, under all circumstances, a sphere sufficiently large to protect the commu 
nity against danger from without and violence and anarchy within. The residuum 
belongs to liberty. More cannot be safely or rightly allotted to it. 

“ But some communities require a far greater amount of power than others to 
protect them against anarchy and external dangers; and, of course, the sphere of 
liberty in such, must be proportionally contracted. The causes calculated to enlarge 
the one and contract the other, are numerous and various. Some are physical;— 
such as open and exposed frontiers, surrounded by powerful and hostile neighbors. 
Others are moral;—such as the different degrees of intelligence, patriotism, and 
virtue among the mass of the community, and their experience and proficiency in 
the art of self-government. Of these, the moral are, by far, the most influential. 
A community may possess all the necessary moral qualifications, in so high a degree, 
as to be capable of self-government under the most adverse circumstances ; while, 
on the other hand, another may be so sunk in ignorance and vice, as to be incapable 
of forming a conception of liberty, or of living, even when most favored by circum¬ 
stances, under any other than an absolute and despotic government. 

“ The principle, in all communities, according to these numerous and various 
causes, assigns to power and liberty their proper spheres. To allow to liberty, in 
any case, a sphere of action more extended than this assigns, would lead to anarchy ; 
and this, probably, in the end, to a contraction instead of an enlargement of its 
sphere. Liberty, then, when forced on a people unfit for it, would, instead of a 
blessing, be a curse; as it would, in its reaction, lead directly to anarchy,—the 
greatest of all curses. No people, indeed, can long enjoy more liberty than that to 
which their situation and advanced intelligence and morals fairly entitle them. If 
more than this be allowed, they must soon fall into confusion and disorder,—to be 
followed, if not by anarchy and despotism, by a change to a form of government 
more simple and absolute ; and, therefore, better suited to their condition. And 
hence, although it may be true, that a people may not have as much liberty as they 
are fairly entitled to, and are capable of enjoying,—yet the reverse is unquestion¬ 
ably true,—that no people can long possess more than they are fairly entitled to. 

“ Liberty, indeed, though among the greatest of blessings, is not so great as that 
of protection ; inasmuch, as the end of the former is the progress and improvement 
of the race,—while that of the latter is its preservation and perpetuation. And 
hence, when the two come into conflict, liberty must, and ever ought, to yield to 
protection ; as the existence of the race is of greater moment than its improvement. 

“ It follows, from what has been stated, that it is a great and dangerous error to 
suppose that all people are equally entitled to liberty. It is a reward to be earned, 
not a blessing to be gratuitously lavished on all alike ;—a reward reserved for the 
intelligent, the patriotic, the virtuous and deserving;—and not a boon to be bestowed 
on a people too ignorant, degraded and vicious, to be capable either of appreciating 
or of enjoying it. Nor is it any disparagement to liberty, that such is, and ought to 
be the case. On the contrary, its greatest praise,—its proudest distinction is, that an 
all-wise Providence has reserved it, as the noblest and highest reward for the de¬ 
velopment of our faculties, moral and intellectual. A reward more appropriate than 
liberty could not be conferred on the deserving;—nor a punishment inflicted on the 
undeserving more just, than to be subject to lawless and despotic rule. This dispen¬ 
sation seems to be the result of some fixed law;—and every effort to disturb or 
defeat it, by attempting to elevate a people in the scale of liberty, above the point to 
which they are entitled to rise, must ever prove abortive, and end in disappointment. 
The progress of a people rising from a lower to a higher point in the scale of liberty 
is necessarily slow and by attempting to precipitate, we either retard, or perma¬ 
nently defeat it. 

“ There is another error, not less great and dangerous, usually associated with the 
one which has just been considered. I refer to the opinion, that liberty and equality 
are so intimately united, that liberty cannot be perfect without perfect equality. 


22 


“ That they are united to a certain extent,—and that equality of citizens, in the 
eyes of the law, is essential to liberty in a popular government, is conceded. But 
to go further, and make equality of condition essential to liberty, would be to 
destroy both liberty and progress. The reason is, that inequality of condition, while 
it is a necessary consequence of liberty, is, at the same time, indispensable to pro¬ 
gress. In order to understand why this is so, it is necessary to bear in mind, that 
the main spring to progress is, the desire of individuals to better their condition ; 
and that the strongest impulse which can be given to it is, to leave individuals free 
to exert themselves in the manner they may deem best for that purpose, as far at 
least as it can be done consistently with the ends for which government is ordained, 
—and to secure to all the fruits of their exertions. Now, as individuals ditfer 
greatly from each other, in intelligence, sagacity, energy, perseverance, skill, habits 
of industry and economy, physical power, position and opportunity,—the necessary 
effect of leaving all free to exert themselves to better their condition, must be a cor¬ 
responding inequality between those who may possess these qualities and advan¬ 
tages in a high degree, and those who may be deficient in them. The only means 
by which this result can be prevented are, either to impose such restrictions on the 
exertions of those who may possess them in a high degree, as will place them on a 
level with those who do not; or to deprive them of the fruits of their exertions. 
But to impose such restrictions on them would be destructive of liberty,—while, to 
deprive them of the fruits of their exertions, would be to destroy the desire of bet¬ 
tering their, condition. It is, indeed, this inequality of condition between the front 
and rear ranks, in the march of progress, which gives so strong an impulse to the 
former to maintain their position, and to the latter to press forward into their files. 
This gives to progress its greatest impulse. To force the front rank back to the rear, 
or attempt to push forward the rear into line with the front, by the interposition of 
the government, would put an end to the impulse, and effectually arrest the march 
of progress. 

“ These great and dangerous errors have their origin in the prevalent opinion 
that all men are born free and equal;—than which nothing can be more unfounded 
and false. It rests upon the assumption of a faqt, which is contrary to universal 
observation, in whatever light it may be regarded. It is, indeed, difficult to explain 
how an opinion so destitute of all sound reason, ever could have been so extensively 
entertained, unless we regard it as being confounded with another, which has some 
semblance of truth ;—but which, when properly understood, is not less false and 
dangerous. I refer to the assertion, that all men are equal in the state of nature ; 
meaning, by a state of nature, a state of individuality, supposed to have existed 
prior to the social and political state; and in which men lived apart and independent 
of each other. If such a state ever did exist, all men would have been, indeed, free 
and equal in it ; that is, free to do as they pleased, and exempt from the authority 
or control of others—as, by supposition, it existed anterior to society and govern¬ 
ment. But such a state is purely hypothetical. It never did, nor can exist; as it is 
inconsistent with the preservation and perpetuation of the race. It is, therefore, a 
great misnomer to call it the state of nature. Instead of being the natural state of 
man, it is, of all conceivable states, the most opposed to his nature—most repugnant 
to his feelings, and most incompatible with his wants. His natural state is, the 
social and political—the one for which his Creator made him, and the only one in 
which he can preserve and perfect his race. As, then, there never was such^a state 
as the, so called, state of nature, and never can be, it follows, that men, instead of 
being born in it, are born in the social and political state, and of course, instead of 
being born free and equal, are born subject, not only to parental authority, but to the 
laws and institutions of the country where born, and under whose protection they 
draw their first breath. With these remarks, I return from this digression, to resume 
the thread of the discourse. 

“ It follows, from all that has been said, that the more perfectly a government 


23 


combines power and liberty,—that is, the greater its power and the more enlarged 
and secure the liberty of individuals, the more perfectly it fulfils the ends for which 
government is ordained. To show, then, that the government of the concurrent 
majority is better calculated to fulfil them than that of the numerical, it is only 
necessary to explain why the former is better suited to combine a higher degree of 
power and a wider scope of liberty than the latter. I shall begin with the former. 

“The concurrent majority, then, is better suited to enlarge and secure the bounds 
of liberty, because it is better suited to prevent government from passing beyond its 
proper limits, and to restrict it to its primary end,-—the protection of the community. 
But in doing this, it leaves, necessarily, all beyond it open and free to individual 
exertions ; and thus enlarges and secures the sphere of liberty to the greatest extent 
which the condition of the community will admit, as has been explained. The ten¬ 
dency of government to pass beyond its proper limits is what exposes liberty to 
danger, and renders it insecure; and it is the strong counteraction of governments 
of the concurrent majority to this tendency which makes them so favorable to liberty.- 
On the contrary, those of the numerical, instead of imposing and counteracting this 
tendency, add to it increased strength, in consequence of the violent party struggles 
incident to them, as has been fully explained. And hence their encroachments on 
liberty, and the danger to which it is exposed under such governments. 

“So great, indeed, is the difference between the two in this respect, that liberty 
is little more than a name under all governments of the absolute form, including 
that of the numerical inajority ; and* can only have a secure and durable existence 
under those of the concurrent or constitutional form. The latter, by giving to each 
portion of the community which may be unequally affected by its action, a negative 
on the others, prevents all partial or local legislation, and restricts its action to such 
measures as are designed for the protection and the good of the whole. In doing 
this, it secures, at the same time, the rights and liberty of the people, regarded 
individually ; as each portion consists of those who, whatever may be the diversity 
of interests among themselves, have the same interest in reference to the action of 
the government. 

“ Such being the case, the interest of each individual may be safely confided to 
the majority, or voice of his portion, against that of all others, and, of course, the 
government itself. It is only through an organism which vests each with a negative, 
in some one form or another, that those who have like interests in preventing the 
government from passing beyond its proper sphei’e, and encroaching on the rights 
and liberty of individuals, can co-operate peaceably and effectually in resisting the 
encroachments of power, and thereby preserve their rights and liberty. Individual 
resistance is too feeble, and the difficulty of concert and co-operation too great, 
unaided by such an organism, to oppose, successfully, the organized power of govern¬ 
ment, with all the means of the community at its disposal; especially in populous 
countries of great extent, where concert and co-operation are almost impossible. 
Even when the oppression of the government comes to be too great to be borne, and 
force is resorted to in order to overthrow it, the result is rarely ever followed bv the 
establishment of liberty. The force sutffcient to overthrow an oppressive govern¬ 
ment is usually sufficient to establish one equally, or more, oppressive in its place. 
And hence, in no governments, except those that rest on the principle of the con¬ 
current or constitutional majority, can the people guard their liberty against power; 
and hence, also, when lost, the great difficulty and uncertainty of regaining it by force. 

“ It may be further affirmed, that, being more favorable to the enlargement and 
security of liberty, governments of the concurrent, must necessarily be more favor¬ 
able to progress, development, improvement, and civilization,—and, of course, to the 
increase of power which results from, and depends on these, than those of the 
numerical majority. That it is liberty which gives to them their greatest impulse, 
has already been shown ; and it now remains to show, that these, in turn, contribute 
greatly to the increase of power. 


24 


“In tlie early stages of society, numbers and individual prowess constituted the 
principal elements of power. In a more advanced stage, when communities had 
passed from the barbarous to the civilized state, disciplimj, strategy, weapons of 
increased power, and money,—as the means of meeting increased expense,—became 
additional and important elements. In this stage, the effects of progress and improve¬ 
ment on the increase of power, began to be disclosed; but still numbers and personal 
])rowess were sufficient, for a long period, to enable barbarous nations to contend 
successfully with the civilized,—and, in the end, to overpower them,—as the pages 
of history abundantly testify. But a more advanced progress, with its numerous 
inventions and improvements, has furnished new and far more powerful and de¬ 
structive implements of offence and defence, and greatly increased the intelligence 
and wealth, necessary to engage the skill and meet the increased expense required 
for their construction and application to purposes of war. The discovery of gun¬ 
powder, and the use of steam as an impelling force, and their application to military 
purposes, have for ever settled the question of ascendency between civilized and 
barbarous communities, in favor of the former. Indeed, these, with other improve¬ 
ments, belonging to the |)resent state of progress, have given to communities the 
most advanced, a superiority over those the least so, almost as great as that of 
the latter over the brute creation. And among the civilized, the same causes have 
decided the question of superiority, where other circumstances are nearly equal, in 
favor of those whose governments have given the greatest impulse to development, 
progress, and improvement; that is, to those whose liberty is the largest and best 
secured. Among these, England and the United States afford striking examples, not 
only of the effects of liberty in increasing power, but of the more perfect adaptation 
of governments founded on the principle of the concurrent, or constitutional majority, 
to enlarge and secure liberty. They are both governments’ of this description, as 
will be shown hereafter. 

“But in estimating the power of a community, moral, as well as physical causes, 
must be taken into the calculation ; and in estimating the effects of liberty on power, 
it must not be overlooked, that it is, in itself, an important agent in augmenting the 
force of moral, as well as of physical power. It bestows on a people elevation, self- 
reliance, energy, and enthusiasm ; and these combined, give to physical power a 
vastly augmented and almost irresistible impetus. 

“ These, however, are not the only elements of moral power. There are others, 
and among them harmony, unanimity, devotion to country, and a disposition to 
elevate to places of trust and power, those who are distinguished for wisdom and 
experience. These, when the occasion requires it, will, without compulsion, and 
from their very nature, unite and put forth the entire force of the community in the 
most efficient manner, without hazard to its institutions or its liberty. 

“ All these causes combined, give to a community its maximum of power. 
Either of them, without the other, would leave it comparatively feeble. But it can¬ 
not be necessary, after what has been stated, to enter into any further explanation or 
argument in order to establish the superiority of governments of the concurrent 
majority over the numerical, in developing the great elements of moral power. So 
vast is this superiority, that the one, by its operation, necessarily leads to their 
development, while the other as necessarily prevents it,—as has been fully shown. 

“ Such are the many and striking advantages of the concurrent over the numerical 
majority. Against the former but two objections can be made. The one is, that it 
is difficult of construction, which has already been sufficiently noticed; and the 
other, that it would be impracticable to obtain the concurrence of conflicting inter¬ 
ests, where they were numerous and diversified ; or, if not, that the process for 
this purpose, would be too tardy to meet, with sufficient promptness, the many and 
dangerous emergencies, to which all communities are exposed. This objection is 
plausible ; and deserves a fuller notice than it has yet received. 

“ The diversity of opinion is usually so great, on almost all questions of •policy, 


that it is not surprising, on a sliglit view of the subject, it should be thought im¬ 
practicable to bring the various conflicting interests of a community to unite on any 
one line of policy;—or, that a government, founded on such a principle, would be 
too slow in its movements and too weak in its foundation to succeed in practice. 
But, plausible as it may seem at the first glance, a more deliberate view will show, 
that this opinion is erroneous. It is true, that, when there is no urgent necessity, 
it is difficult to bring those who differ, to agree on any one line of action. Each will 
naturally insist on taking the course he may think best;—and, from pride of opinion, 
will be unwilling to yield to others. But the case is different when there is an 
urgent necessity to unite on some common course of action ; as reason and experience 
both prove. When something mmt be done,—and when it can be done only by the 
united consent of all,—the necessity of the case will force to a compromise ;—be 
the cause of that necessity what it may. On all questions of acting, necessity, 
where it exists, is the overruling motive; and where, in such cases, compromise 
among the parties is an indispensable condition to acting, it exerts an overruling 
influence in predisposing them to acquiesce in some one opinion or course of action. 
Experience furnishes many examples in confirmation of this important truth. 
Among these, the trial by jury is the most familiar, and on that account, will be 
selected for illustration. 

“ In these, twelve individuals, selected without discrimination, must unanimously 
concur in opinion,—under the obligations of an oath to find a true verdict, according 
to law and evidence ; and this, too, not unfrequently under such great difficulty and 
doubt, tliat the ablest and most experienced judges and advocates differ in opinion, 
after careful examination. And yet, as impracticable as this mode of trial would 
seem to a superficial observer, it is found, in practice, not only to succeed, but to be 
the safest, the Avisest and the best that human ingenuity has ever devised. When 
closely investigated, the cause will be found in the necessity, under which the jury 
is placed, to agree unanimously, in order to find a verdict. This necessity acts as the 
predisposing cause of concurrence in some common opinion ; and with such efficacy, 
that a jury rarely fails to find a verdict. 

“ Under its potent influence, the jurors take their seats with the disposition to give 
a fair and impartial hearing to the arguments on both sides,—meet together in the 
jury-room,—not as disputants, but calmly to hear the opinions of each other, and to 
compare and weigh the arguments on Avhich they are founded ;—and, finally, to adopt 
that which, on the whole, is thought to be true. Under the influence of this dispo.n- 
tion to harmonize, one after another falls into the same opinion, until unanimity is 
obtained. Hence its practicability ;—and hence, also, its peculiar excellence. Ko 
thing, indeed, can be more favorable to the success of truth and j ustice, than this pre¬ 
disposing influence caused by the necessity of being unanimous. It is so much so, as 
to compensate for the defect of legal knowledge, and a high degree of intelligence on 
the part of those who usually compose juries. If the necessity of unanimity were 
dispensed with, and the finding of a jury made to depend on a bare majority, jury- 
trial, instead of being one of the greatest improvements in the judicial department of 
government, would be one of the greatest evils that could be iilflicted on the commu¬ 
nity. It would be, in such case, the conduit through which all the factious feelings 
of the day would enter and contaminate justice at its source. 

“But the same cause would act Avith still greater force in predisposing the vari¬ 
ous interests of the community to agree in a Avell-organized government, founded on 
the concurrent majority. The necessity for unanimity, in order to keep the govern¬ 
ment in motion, Avould be far more urgent, and Avould act under circumstances still 
more faA^'orable to secure it. It AAmuld be superfluous, after AAdiat has been stated, to 
add other reasons in order to sIioav that no necessity, physical or moral, can be more 
imperious than that of government. It is so much so that, to suspend its action alto¬ 
gether, even for an inconsiderable period, Avould subject the community to convulsions 
and anarchy. But in go\mrnments of the concurrent majority such fatal consequences 


26 


can only be avoided by tlie unanimous concurrence or acquiescence of tlie various 
portions of tlie community. Such is the imperious character of the necessity which 
impels to compromise under govel’iiments of this description. 

“ But to have a just conception of the overpowering influence it would exert, the 
circumstances under which it would act must be taken into consideration. These 
will be found, on comparison, much more favorable than those under which juries 
act. In the latter case there is nothing besides the necessity of unanimity in finding 
a verdict, and the inconvenience to which they might be subjected in the event of 
division, to induce juries to agree, except the love of truth and justice, which, when 
not counteracted by some improper motive or bias, more or less influences all, not 
excepting the most depraved. In the case of governments of the concurrent majority, 
there is, besides these, the love of country, than which, if not counteracted by the 
unequal and oppressive action of government, or other causes, few motives exert a 
greater away. It comprehends, indeed, within itself, a large portion both of our 
individual and social feelings ; and, hence, its almost boundless control when left free 
to act. But the government of the concurrent majority leaves it free, by preventing 
abuse and oppression, and, with them, the wliole train of feelings and passions which 
lead to discord and conflict between different portions of the community. Impelled 
by the imperious necessity of preventing the suspension of the action of government, 
with the fatal consequences to which it would lead, and by the strong additional 
impulse derived from an ardent love of country, each portion would regard the sacrifice 
it might have to make by yielding its peculiar interest to secure the common interest 
and safety of all, including its own, as nothing compared to the evils that would be 
inflicted on all, including its own, by pertinaciously adhering to a different line of 
action. So powerful, indeed, would be the motives for concurring, and, under such 
circumstances, so weak wmuld be those opposed to it, the wonder would be, not that 
there should, but that there should not be a compromise. 

“But to form a juster estimate of the full force of this impulse to compromise, 
there must be added- that, in governments of the concurrent majority, each portion, 
in order to advance its own peculiar interests, w'ould have to conciliate all others, by 
showing a disposition to advance theirs ; and, for this purpose, each would select to 
represent it, those whose wisdom, patriotism, and weight of character, would com¬ 
mand the confidence of the others. Under its influence,—and with representatives so 
well qualified to accomplish the object for which they were selected,—the prevailing 
desire would be, to promote the common interests of the whole ; and, hence, the com¬ 
petition would be, not which should yield the least to promote the common good, but 
which should yield the most. It is thus, that concession would cease to be considered 
a sacrifice,—would become a free-will offering on the altar of the country, and lose 
the name of compromise. And herein is to be found the feature, which distin¬ 
guishes governments of the concurrent majority so strikingly from those of the 
numerical. In the latter, each faction, in the struggle to obtain the control of the 
government, elevates to power the designing, the artful, and unscrupulous, who, in 
their devotion to party,—instead of aiming at the good of the whole,—aim exclusively 
at securing the ascendency of party. 

“ When traced to its source, this difference will be found to originate in the fact, 
that, in governments of the concurrent majority, individual feelings are, from its 
organism, necessarily enlisted on the side of the social, and made to unite with them in 
promoting the interests of the whole, as the best way of promoting the separate inter¬ 
ests of each ; while, in those of the numerical majority, the social are necessarily 
enlisted on the side of the individual, and made to contribute to the interest of 
parties, regardless of that of the whole. To effect the former,—to enlist the indi¬ 
vidual on the side of the social feelings to promote the good of the whole, is the great¬ 
est possible achievement of the science of government ; while, to enlist the social on 
the side of the individual to promote the interest of parties at the expense of the 
good of the whole, is the greatest blunder which ignorance can possibly commit. 


27 


“ To tins, also, may be referred the greater solidity of foundation on which govern¬ 
ments of the concurrent majority repose. Both, ultimately, rest on necessity ; for 
force, by which those of the numerical majority are upheld, is only acquiesced in from 
necessity; a necessity not more imperious, however, than that which compels the 
different portions, in governments of the concurrent majoi’ity, to acquiesce in compro¬ 
mise. There is, however, a great difference in the motive, the feeling, the aim, which 
characterize the act in the two cases. In the one, it is done with that reluctance and 
hostility ever incident to enforced submission to what is regarded as injustice and op¬ 
pression ; accompanied by the desire and purpose to seize on the first favorable ojoportu- 
nity for resistance:—but in the other, willingly and cheerfully, under the impulse of an 
exalted patriotism, impelling all to acquiesce in whatever the common good requires. 

“ It is, then, a great error to suppose that the government of the concurrent 
majority is impracticable ;—or that it rests on a feeble foundation. History fur¬ 
nishes many examples of such governments ;—and among them, one, in which the 
principle was carried to an extreme that would be thought impracticable, had it 
never existed. I refer to that of Poland. In this it was carried to such an extreme 
that, in the election of her kings, the concurrence or acquiescence of every indi¬ 
vidual of the nobles and gentry present, in an assembly numbering usually from one 
hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand, was required to make a choice ; thus 
giving to each individual a veto on his election. So, likewise, every member of her 
Diet, (the supreme legislative body,) consisting of the king, tli-e senate, bishops and 
deputies of the nobility and gentry of the palatinates, possessed a veto on all its pro¬ 
ceedings ;—thus making an unanimous vote necessary to enact a law, or to adopt 
any measure whatever. And, as if to carry the principle to the utmost extent, the 
veto of a single member not only defeated the particular bill or measure in question, 
but prevented all others, passed during the session, from taking effect. Further, the 
principle could not be carried. It, in fact, made every individual of the nobility and 
gentry, a distinct element in the oiganism ;—or, to vary the expression, made him 
an Estate of the kingdom. And yet this government lasted, in this form, more than 
two centuries ; embracing the period of Poland’s greatest power and renown. Twice, 
during its existence, she protected Christendom, when in great danger, by defeating 
the Turks under the walls of Vienna, and permanently arresting thereby the tide of 
their conquests westward. 

“ It is true her government was finally subverted, and the people subjugated, in 
consequence of the extreme to which the principle was carried ; not, however, 
because of its tendency to dissolution/row iceakness, but from the facility it afforded 
to powerful and unscrupulous neighbors to control, by their intrigues, the election 
of her kings. But the fact, that a government, in which the principle was carried 
to the utmost extreme, not only existed, but existed for so long a period, in great 
power and S})lendor, is proof conclusive both of its practicability and its compati¬ 
bility with the power and permanency of government. 

“ Another example, not so striking indeed, but yet deserving notice, is furnished 
by the government of a portion of the aborigines of our own country. I refer to 
the Confederacy of the Six Nations, who inhabited what is' now called the western 
])ortion of the State of New-York. One chief delegate, chosen by each nation,— 
associated with six others of his own selection,—and making, in all, forty-two mem¬ 
bers,—constituted their federal, or general government. When met, they formed 
the council of the union,—and discussed and decided all qiiestions relating to the 
common welfare. As in lhe Polish Diet, each member possessed a veto on its deci¬ 
sion ; so that nothing could be done without the united consent of all. But this, 
instead of making the Confederacy weak, or impracticable, had the opposite effect. 
It secured harmony in council and action, and with them a great increase of power. 
The Six Nations, in consequence, became the most powerful of all the Indian tribes 
within the limits of our country. They carried their conquest and authcrity fax 
beyond the country they originally occupied. 


28 


“ I pass by, for the present, the most distinguished of all these examples the 
Roman Republic ;—where the veto, or negative power, was carried, not indeed to the 
same extreme as in the Polish government, but very far, and with great increase of 
power and stability ;—as I shall show more at large hereafter. 

“ It may be thought,—and doubtless many have supposed, that the defects inhe¬ 
rent in the government of the numerical majority may be remedied by a free press, 
as the organ of public opinion,—especially in the more advanced stage of society,— 
so as to supersede the necessity of the concurrent majority to counteract its tendency 
to oppression and abuse of power. It is not my aim to detract from the importance 
of the press, nor to underestimate the great power and influence which it has given 
to public opinion. On the contrary, I admit these are so great, as to entitle it to be 
considered a new and important political element. Its influence is, at the present 
day, on the increase ; and it is highly probable that it may, in combination with the 
causes which have contributed to raise it to its present importance, effect, in time, 
great changes,—social and political. But however important its present influence 
may be, or may hereafter become,—or, however great and beneficial the changes to 
which it may ultimately lead, it can never counteract the tendency of the numerical 
majority to the abuse of power,—nor supersede the necessity of the concurrent, as 
an essential element in the formation of constitutional governments. These it cannot 
effect for two reasons, either of which is conclusive. 

“ The one is, that it cannot change that principle of our nature, which makes 
constitutions necessary to prevent government from abusing its powers,—and gov¬ 
ernment necessary to protect and perfect society. 

“ Constituting, as this principle does, an essential part of our nature,—no increase 
of knowledge and intelligence, no enlargement of our sympathetic feelings, no influ¬ 
ence of education, or modification of the condition of society can change it. But so 
long as it shall continue to be an essential part of our nature, so long will govern¬ 
ment be necessary ; and so long as this continues to be necessary, so long, will con¬ 
stitutions, also, be necessary to counteract its tendency to the abuse of power,—and 
so long must the concurrent majority remain an essential element in the formation 
of constitutions. The press may do much,—by giving impulse to the progress, of 
knowledge and intelligence, to aid the cause of education, and to bring about salu¬ 
tary changes in the condition of society. These, in turn, may do much to explode 
political errors,—to teach how governments should be constructed in order to fulfil 
their ends; and by what means they can be best preserved, when so constructed. 
They may, also, do much to enlarge the social, and to restrain the individual feel¬ 
ings and thereby to bring about a state of things, when far less power will be 
required by governments to guard against internal disorder and violence, and exter¬ 
nal danger ; and when, of course, the sphere of power may be greatly contracted 
and That of lilerty proportionally enlarged. But all this would not change the 
nature of man ; nor supersede the necessity of government. For so long as govern¬ 
ment exists, the possession of its control, as the means of directing its action and 
dispensing its honors and emoluments, will be an object of desire. While this con¬ 
tinues to be the case, it must, in governments of the numerical majority, lead to 
party struggles ; and, as has been shown, to all the consequences, which necessaiily 
follow in their train, and, against which, the only remedy is the concurrent majority. 

“ The other reason is to be found in the nature of the influence, which the press 
politically exercises. 

“ It is similar, in most respects, to that of suffrage. They are, indeed, both 
organs of public opinion. The principal difference is, that the one has much more 
agency in forming public opinion, while the other gives a more authentic and authori¬ 
tative exjiression to it. Reg'arded in either light, the press caiin.ot, of itself, guaid 
any more against the abuse of power, than suffrage ;.and for the same reason. 

“ If what is called public opinion were always the opinion of the whole commu¬ 
nity, the press would, as its organ, be an effective guard against the abuse of jmwer, 




29 


and supersede tlie necessity of the concurrent majority ; just as the right of suffrage 
would do, where the community, in reference to the action of government, had but 
one interest. But such is not the case. On the contrary, wliat is called public 
opinion, instead of being the united opinion of the whole community, is, usually, 
nothing more than the opinion or voice of the strongest interest, or combination of 
interests ; and, not unfrequently, of a small, but energetic and active portion of the 
whole. Public opinion, in relation to government and its policy, is as much divided 
and diversified, as are the interests of the community ; and the press, instead of 
being the organ of the whole, is usually but the organ of these various and diversi¬ 
fied interests respectively ; or, rather, of the parties growing out of them. It is 
used by them as the means of controlling public opinion, and of so moulding it, as to 
promote their peculiar interests, and to aid in carrying on the warfare of party. 
But as the organ and instrument of parties, in governments of the numerical majority, 
it is as incompetent as suffrage itself, to counteract the tendency to oppression and 
abuse of power ;—and can, no more than that, supersede the necessity of the concur¬ 
rent majority. On the contrary, as the instrument of party warfare, it contributes 
greatly to increase party excitement, and the violence and virulence 'of party strug¬ 
gles ; and," in the same degree, the tendency to oppression and abuse of power. In¬ 
stead, then, of superseding the necessity of the concurrent majority, it increases it, by 
increasing the violence and force of party feelings,—in like manner as party cau¬ 
cuses and party machinery; of the latter of which, indeed, it forms an important 
part. 

“In one respect, and only one, the government of the numerical majority has the 
advantage over that of the concurrent, if, indeed, it can be called an advantage. I 
refer to its simplicity and facility of construction. It is simple indeed, wielded, as it 
is, by a single power—the will of the greater number—and very easy of construction. 
For this purpose, nothing more is necessary than universal suffrage, and the regula¬ 
tion of the manner of voting, so as to give to the greater number the supreme con¬ 
trol over every department of government. 

“ But, whatever advantages simplicity and facility of construction may give it, the 
other forms of absolute government possess them in a still higher degree. The con¬ 
struction of the government of the numerical majority, simple as it is, requires some 
preliminary measures and arrangements ; while the others, especially the monarchi¬ 
cal, will, in its absence, or where it proves iucom[)etent, force themselves on the 
community. And hence, apiong other reasons, the tendency of all governments is, 
from the more com])lex and difficult of construction, to the more simple and easily 
constructed; and, finally, to absolute monarchy, as the most simple of all. Com¬ 
plexity and difficulty of construction, as far as they form objections, apply, not only 
to governments of the concurrent majority of the popular form, but to constitutional 
governments of every form. The least complex, and the most easily constructed of 
them, are much more complex and difficult of construction than any one of the 
absolute forms. Indeed, so great has been this difficulty, that their construction has 
been the result, not so much of wisdom and patriotism, as of favorable combinations 
of circumstances. They have, for the most part, grown out pf the struggles between 
conflicting interests, which, from some fortunate turn, have ended in a compromise, 
by which both parties have been admitted, in some one way or another, to have a 
separate and distinct voice in the government. Where this has not been the case, 
they have been the pi'odiict of fortunate circumstances, acting in conjunction with 
some'pressing danger, which forced their adoption, as the only means by which it 
could be avoided. It would seem that it has exceeded human sagacity deliberately 
to plan and construct constitutional governments, with a full knowledge of the prin¬ 
ciples on which they were formed ; or to reduce them to practice without the pres¬ 
sure of some immediate and urgent necessity. Nor is it surprising that such should 
be the case ; for it would seem almost impossible for any man, or body of men, to be 
so profoundly and thoroughly acquainted with the people of any community which 






30 


has made any considerable progress in civilization and wealth, with all the diversified 
interests ever accompanying them, as to be able to organize constitutional govern¬ 
ments suited to their condition. But, even were this possible, it would be difficult 
to find any community sufficiently enlightened and patriotic to adopt such a govern¬ 
ment, without the compulsion of some pressing necessity. A constitution, to suc¬ 
ceed, must spring from the bosom of the community, and be adapted to the intelli¬ 
gence and character of the people, and all the multifarious relations, internal and 
external, which distinguish one people from another. If it do not, it will prove, in 
practice, to be, not a constitution, but a cumbrous and useless machine, which must 
be speedily superseded and laid aside, for some other more simple, and better suited 
to their condition. 

“ It would thus seem almost necessary that governments should commence in 
some one of the simple and absolute forms, which, however well suited to the com¬ 
munity in its earlier stages, must, in its progress, lead to oppression and abuse of 
power, and, finally, to an appeal to force,—to be succeeded by a military despotism, 
—unless the conflicts to which it leads should be fortunately adjusted by a compro¬ 
mise, which will give to the respective parties a participation in the control of the 
government; and thereby lay the foundation of a constitutional government, to be 
afterwards matured and perfected. Such governments have been, emphatically, the 
product of circumstances. And hence, the difficulty of one people imitating the 
government of another. And hence, also, the importance of terminating all civil 
conflicts by a compromise, which shall prevent either party from obtaining complete 
control, and thus subjecting the other. 

“Of the different forms of constitutional governments, the popular is the most 
complex and difficult of construction. It is, indeed, so difficult, that ours, it is 
believed, may with truth be said to be the only one of a purely popular character, 
of any considerable importance, that ever existed. The cause is to be found in the 
fact, that, in the other two forms, society is arranged in artificial orders or classes. 
Where these exist, the line of distinction between them is so strongly marked as to 
throw into shade, or, otherwise, to absorb all interests which are foreign to them 
respectively. Hence, in an aristocracy, all interests are, politically, reduced to two, 
—the nobles and the people ; and in a monarcliy, with a nobility, into three,—the 
monarch, the nobles, and the p)eople. In either case, they are so few that the sense 
of each may be taken separately, through its appropriate organ, so as to give to each 
a concurrent voice, and a neg-ative on the other, through the usual departments of 
the government, without making it too complex, or too tardy in its movements to 
perform, with prohiptness and energy, all the necessary functions of government. 

“ The case is different in constitutional governments of the popular form. In 
consequence of the absence of these artificial distinctions, the various natural inter¬ 
ests, resulting from diversity of pursuits, condition, situation and character of dif 
ferent portions of the people,—and from the action of the government itself,—arise 
into prominence, and struggle to obtain the ascendency. They will, it is true, in 
governments of the numerical majority, ultimately coalesce, and form two great 
parties ; but not so closely as to lose entirely their separate character and existence. 
These they will ever be ready to re-assume, when the objects for which they coa¬ 
lesced are accomplished. To overcome the difficulties occasioned by so g’reat a diver¬ 
sity of interests, an organism far more complex is necessary. 

“Another obstacle, difficult to be overcome, opposes the formation of popular 
constitutional governments. It is much more difficult to terminate the struggles 
between conflicting interests, by compromise, in absolute popular governments, than 
in an aristocracy or monarchy. 

“ In an aristocracy, the object of the people, in the ordinary struggle between 
them and the nobles, is not, at least in its early stages, to overthrow the nobility and 
revolutionize the government,—but to participate in its powers. Notwithstanding 
the oppression to which they may be subjected, under this form of government, the 


81 


people commonly feel no small degree of respect for the descendants of a long line 
of distinguished ancestors ; and do not usually as])ire to more,—in opposing the 
authority of the nobles,—“than to obtain such a participation in the powers of the 
government, as will enable them to correct its abuses and to lighten their burdens. 
Among the nobility, on the other hand, it sometimes happens that there are in- 
viduals of great influence with both sides, who have the good sense and patriotism to 
interpose, in order to effect a compromise by yielding to the reasonable demands of 
the people ; and, thereby, to avoid the hazard of a final and decisive appeal to force. 
It is thus, by a judicious and timely compromise, the people, in such governments, 
may be raised to a participation in the administration sufficient for their protection, 
without the loss of authority on the part of the nobles. 

“ In the case of a monarchy, the process is somewhat different. Where it is a 
military despotism, the people rarely have the spirit or intelligence to attempt resist¬ 
ance ; or,if otherwise, their resistance must almost necessarily terminate in defeat, or 
in a mere change of dynasty,—by the elevation of their leader to the throne. It is 
different, where the monarch is surrounded by an hereditary nobility. In a struggle 
between him and them, both (especially the monarch) are usually disposed to court 
the people, in order to enlist them on their respective sides,—a state of things highly 
favorable to their elevation. In this case, the struggle, if it should be long continued 
without decisive results, would almost necessarily raise them to political importance, 
and to a participation in the powers of the government. 

“ The case is different in an absolute Democracy. Party conflicts between the 
majority and minority, in such governments, can hardly ever terminate in compro¬ 
mise.—The object of the opposing minority is to expel the majority from power; 
and of the majority to maintain their hold upon it. It is, on both sides, a struggle 
for the whole,—a struggle that must determine which shall be the governing, and 
which the subject party ;—and, in character, object and result, not unlike that 
between competitors for the sceptre in absolute monarchies. Its regular course, as 
has been shown, is, excessive violence,—an appeal to force,—followed by revolution, 
—and terminating at last, in the elevation to supreme power of the general of the 
successful party. And hence, among other reasons, aristocracies and monarchies 
more readily assume the constitutional form than absolute popular governments. 

“ Of the three different forms, the monarchical has hitherto been much the most 
prevalent, and, generally, the most powerful and durable. This result is doubtless 
to be attributed principally to the fact that, in its absolute form, it is the most sim¬ 
ple and easily constructed. And hence, as government is indispensable, communities 
having too little intelligence to form or preserve the others, natu’rally fall into this. 
It may also, in part, be attributed to another cause, already alluded to ; that, in its 
organism and character, it is much more closely assimilated than either of the other 
two, to military power ; on which all absolute governments de])end for support. 
And hence, also, the tendency of the others, and of constitutional governments which 
have been so badly constructed or become so disorganized as to requii-e foi’ce to support 
them,—to pass into military despotism,—that is, into monarchy in its most absolute 
and simple form. And hence, again, the fact, that revolutions in absolute mon¬ 
archies, end, almost invariably, in a change of dynasty,—ancf not of the forms of 
gwvernment; as is almost universally the case in the other systems. 

“ But there are, besides these, other causes of a higher character, which con¬ 
tribute much to make monarchies the most prevalent, and, usually, the most durable 
governments. Among them, the leading one is, they are the most susceptible of 
improvement;—that is, they can be more easily and readily modified, so as to prevent, 
to a limited extent, oppression and abuse of power, without assuming the constitu¬ 
tional form, in its strict sense. It slides, almost naturally, into one of the most 
important modifications. I refer to hereditary descent. When this becomes well 
defined and firmly established, the community or kingdom, comes to be regarded by 
the sovereign as the hereditary possession of his family,—a circumstance which 



32 


tends strongly to identify his interests with those of his subjects, and thereby, to 
mitigate the rigor of the government. It gives, besides, great additional security to 
his person ; and prevents, in the same degree, not only the suspicion and hostile 
feelings incident to insecurity,—but invites all those kindly feelings which naturally 
spring up on both sides, between those whose interests are identified,—when there is 
nothing to prevent it. And hence the strong feeling of paternity on the side of the 
sovereign,—and of loyalty on .that of his subjects, which are often exhibited in such 
governments. 

“ There is another improvement of which it is readily susceptible, nearly allied 
to the preceding. The hereditary principle not unfrequently extends to other 
families,—especially to those of the distinguished chieftains, by whose aid the mon¬ 
archy was established, when it originates in conquest. When this is the case,—and 
a powerful body of hereditary nobles suri’ound the sovereign, they oppose a strong 
resistance to his authority, and he to theirs,—tending to the advantage and security 
of the people. Even when they do not succeed in obtaining a participation in the 
powers of the government, they usually acquire sufficient weight to be felt and 
respected. From this state of things, such governments usually, in time, settle 
down on some fixed rules of action, which the sovereign is compelled to respect, and 
by which increased protection and security are acquired by all. It was thus the en¬ 
lightened monarchies of Europe were formed, under which the people of that portion 
of the globe have made such great advances in power, intelligence, and civilization. 

“ To these may be added the greater capacity, which governments of the monarch¬ 
ical form have exhibited, to hold under subjection a large extent of territory, and a 
numerous population ; and which has made them more powerful than others of a 
different form, to the extent, that these constitute an element of power. All these 
causes combined, have given such great and decisive advantages, as to enable them, 
heretofore, to absorb, in the progress of events, the few governments which have, 
from time to time, assumed different forms;—not excepting even the mighty Roman 
Republic, which, after attaining the highest point of power, passed, seemingly under 
the operation of irresistible causes, into a military despotism. 1 say, heretofore,—for 
itTemains to be seen whether they will continue to retain their advantages, in these 
respects, over the others, under the great and growing influence of public opinion, 
and the new and imposing form which popular government has assumed with us. 

“ These have already effected great changes, and will probably effect still greater,— 
adverse to the monarchical form ; but, as yet, these changes have tended rather to 
the absolute, than to the constitutional form of popular government,—for reasons 
which have been explained. If this tendency should continue permanently in the 
same direction, the monarchical form must still retain its advantages, and continue to 
be the most ])revalent. Should this be the case, the alternative will be between 
monarchy and popular government, in the form of the numerical majority,—or abso¬ 
lute democracy ; which, as has been shown, is not only the most fugitive of all the 
forms, but has the strongest tendency of all others to the monarchical. If, on the 
contrary, this tendency, or the changes referred to, should incline to the constitutional 
form of popular government,—and a proper organism come to be regarded as not less 
indispensable than the right of suffrage to the establishment of such governments,— 
in such case, it is not im[)robable that, in the progress of events, the monarchical will 
cease to be the prevalent form of government. Whether they will take this direc¬ 
tion, at least for a long time, will depend on the success of our government,—and a 
correct understanding of the principles on which it is constructed. 

“To comprehend more fully the force and bearing of public opinion, and to form 
a just estimate of the changes to which, aided by the press, it will probably lead, 
politically and socially,—it will be necessary to consider it in connection with the 
causes that have given it an influence so great, as to entitle it to be regarded as a new 
political element. They will, upon investigation, be found in the many discoveries 
and inventions made in the last few centuries. ' 


33 


“ Among tliG more prominent of tliose of an earlier date, stand tlie practical appli¬ 
cation of the magnetic power to the purposes of navigation, by the invention of the 
mariner’s compass ; the discovery of the mode of making gunpowder, and its appli¬ 
cation to the art of war ; and the invention of the art of printing. Among the more 
recent are, the numerous chemical and mechanical discoveries and inventions, and 
their application to the various arts of production ; the application of steam to ma¬ 
chinery of almost every description, especially to such as is designed to facilitate 
transportation and travel by land and water ; and, finally, the invention of the mag¬ 
netic telegraph. 

“ All these have led to important results. Through the invention of the mariner’s 
compass, the globe has been circumnavigated and explored, and all who inhabit it, 
with but few exceptions, brought within the sphere of an all-pervading commerce, 
which is daily diffusing over its surface the light and blessings of civilization. 
Through that of the art of printing, the fruits of observation and reflection, of dis¬ 
coveries and inventions, with all the accumulated stores of previously acquired 
knowledge, are preserved and widely diffused. The application of gunpowder to the 
art of war, has for ever settled the long conflict for ascendency between civilization 
and barbarism, in favor of the former, and thereby guarantied that, whatever knowl¬ 
edge is now accumulated, or may hereafter be added, shall never again be lost. The 
numerous discoveries and inventions, chemical and mechanical, and the application 
of steam to machinery, have increased, many-fold, the productive powers of labor 
and capital; and have, thereby, greatly increased the number, who may devote them¬ 
selves to study and improvement,—and the amount of means necessary for commer¬ 
cial exchanges,—especially between the more and the less advanced and civilized 
])ortions of the globe,—to the great advantage of both, but particularly of the latter. 
The application of steam to the purposes of travel and transportation, by land and 
water, has vastly increased the facility, cheapness and rapidity of both ;—diffusing, 
with them, information and intelligence almost as quickly and as freely as if borne by 
the winds; while the electrical wires outstrip them, in velocity—rivalling, in rapid¬ 
ity, even thought itself. 

“The joint effect of all has been, a great increase and diffusion of knowledge; 
and, with this, an impulse to progress and civilization heretofore unexampled in 4he 
history of the world,—accompanied by a mental energy and activity unprecedented. 

“ To all these causes, public opinion, and its organ, the press, owe their origin and 
great influence. Already they have attained a force in the more civilized porlions of 
the globe sufficient to be felt by all gov'ernments, even the most absolute and des¬ 
potic. But, as great as they now are, they have as yet attained nothing like their 
maximum force. It is probable, that not one of the causes, which have contributed 
to their formation and influence, has yet produced its full effect; while several of the 
most powerful have just begun to operate; and many others, probably of equal or 
even greater force, yet remain to be brought to light. 

“ When the causes now in operation have produced their full effect, and inven- 
■“ions and discoveries shall have been exhausted,—if that may ever be,—they will give 
a force to public opinion, and cause changes, political and social, difficult to be antici¬ 
pated. What will be their final bearing, time only can decide with any certainty. 
That they will, however, greatly improve the condition of man ultimately,—it would 
be impious to doubt. It would be to suppose that the all-wise and beneficent Being, 
—the Creator of all,—had so constituted man, as that the employment of the high, 
intellectual faculties, with which He has been pleased to endow him, in order that he 
might develop the laws that control the great agents of the material world, and make 
them subservient to his use,—would prove to him the cause of permanent evil,—and 
not of permanent good. If, then, such a supposition be inadmissible, they must, in 
their orderly and full development, end in his permanent good. But this cannot be, 
unless the ultimate effect of their action, politically, shall be, to give ascendency to 
that form of government best calculated to fulfil the ends for which government is 
3 


ordained. For, so completely does tlie well-being of our race depend on good gov¬ 
ernment, that it is hardly possible any change, the ultimate effect of which should be 
otherwise, could prove to be a permanent good. 

It is, however, not improbable, that many and great, but temporary evils, will 
follow the changes they have effected, and are destined to effect. It seems to be a 
law in the political, as well as in the material world, that great changes cannot be 
made, except very gradually, without convulsions and revolutions ; to be followed by 
calamities, in the beginning, however beneficial they may prove to be in the end. 
The first effect of such changes, on long-established governments, will be, to unsettle 
the opinions and principles in which they originated,—and which have guided their 
policy,—before those, which the changes are calculated to form and establish, are 
fairly developed and understood. The interval between the decay of the old and the 
formation and establishment of the new, constitutes a period of transition, which 
must always necessarily be one of uncertainty, confusion, error, and wild and fierce 
fanaticism. 

“ The governments of the more advanced and civilized portions of the world are 
now in the midst of this period. It has proved, and will continue to prove a severe 
trial to existing political institutions of every form. Those governments which have 
not tlie sagacity to perceive what is truly public opinion,—to distinguish between it 
and the mere clamor of faction, or shouts of fanaticism,—and the good sense and 
firmness to yield, timely and cautiously, to the claims of the one,—and to resist, 
promptly and decidedly, the demands of the other,—are doomed to fall. Few will 
be able successfully to pass through this period of transition; and these, not without 
shocks and modifications, more or less considerable. It will endure until the govern¬ 
ing and the governed shall better understand the ends for which government is 
ordained, and the form best adapted to accomplish them, under all tbe circumstances 
in which communities may be respectively placed. 

“I shall, in conclusion, proceed to exemplify the elementary principles, which 
have been established, by giving a brief account of the origin and character of the 
governments of Rome and Great Britain ; the two most remarkable and perfect of 
their respective forms of constitutional governments. The object is to show how these 
principles were applied, in the more simple forms of such governments; preparatory 
to an exposition of the mode in which they have been applied in our own more com¬ 
plex system. It will ap])ear that, in each, the principles are the same ; and that the 
difference in their application resulted from the different situation and social con¬ 
dition of the respective communities. They were modified in each, so as to conform 
to these ; and, hence, their remarkable success. They were applied to communities 
in which hereditary rank had long prevailed. Their respective constitutions origin¬ 
ated in concession to the people ; and, through them, they acquired a participation 
in the powers of government. But with us, they were applied to communities where 
all political rank and distinction between citizens were excluded; and where govern¬ 
ment had its origin in the will of the people. 

“ But, however different their origin and character, it will be found that the object 
in each 4as the same,—to blend and harmonize the conflicting interests of the com¬ 
munity ; and the means the same,—taking the sense of each class or portion through 
its appropriate organ, and considering the concurrent sense of all as the sense of the 
whole community. Sucli being the fact, an accurate and clear conception how this 
was effected, in their more simple forms, will enable us better to understand how it 
was accomplished in our far more refined, artificial, and complex form. 

“ It is well known to all, the least conversant with their history, that the Roman 
people consisted of two distinct orders, or classes,—the Patricians and the Plebeians ; 
and that the line of distinction was so strongly drawn, that, for a longtime, the right 
of intermarriage between them was prohibited. After the overthrow of the mon¬ 
archy and the expulsion of the Tarquins, the government fell exclusively under the 
control of the patricians, who, with their clients and dependents, formed, at the time, 


a very numerous and powerful body. At first, while there was danger of the return 
of the exiled family, they treated the plebeians with kindness; but, after it had 
passed away, with oppression and cruelty. 

“ It is not necessary, with the object in view, to enter into a minute account of 
the various acts of oppression and cruelty to which they were subjected. It is suffi¬ 
cient to state, that, according to the usages of war at the time, the territory of a 
conquered people became the property of the conquerors ; and that the plebeians were 
harassed and oppressed by incessant wars, in which the danger and toil were theirs, 
while all the fruits of victory, (the lands of the vanquished, and the spoils of war,) 
accrued to the benefit of their oppressors. The result was such as might be expected. 
They were impoverished, and forced, from necessity, to borrow from the patricians 
at usurious and exorbitant interest, funds with which they had been enriched 
through their blood and toil; and to pledge their all for repayment at stipulated 
periods. In case of default, the pledge became forfeited ; and, under the provisions 
of law in such cases, the debtors were liable to be seized, and sold or imprisoned by 
their creditors in private jails prepared and kept for the purpose. These savage pro¬ 
visions were enforced with the utmost rigor against the indebted and impoverished 
plebeians. They constituted, indeed, an essential part of the S 3 ^stem through which 
they' were plundered and oppressed by the patricians. ^ 

“A system so oppressive could not be endured. The natural consequences followed. 
Deep hatred was engendered between the orders, accompanied by factions, violence, 
and corruption, which distracted and weakened the government. At length, an inci¬ 
dent occurred which roused the indignation of the plebeians to the utmost pitch, and 
which ended in an open rupture between the two orders. 

“ An old soldier, who had long served the country, and had fought with bravery 
in twenty-eight battles, made his escape from the prison of his creditor,—squalid, 
pale, and famished. He implored the protection of the plebeians. A crowd sur¬ 
rounded him; and his tale of service to the country, and the cruelty with which he 
had been treated by his creditor, kindled a flame, which continued to rage until it 
extended to the army. It refused to continue aiyy longer in service,—crossed the 
Anio, and took possession of the saci-ed mount. The patricians divided in opinion as 
to the course which should be pursued. The more violent insisted on an appeal to 
arms, but, fortunately, the counsel of the moderate, which recommended concession 
and compromise, prevailed. Commissioners were appointed to treat with the army’ ; 
and a formal compact was entered into between the orders, and ratified by the oaths 
of each, which conceded to the plebeians the right to elect two tribunes, as the pro¬ 
tectors of their order, and made their persons sacred. The number was afterwards 
increased to ten, and their election by centuries changed to election by’tribes ;—a mode 
by’ which the plebeians secured* a decided preponderance. 

“ Such was the origin of the tribunate ;—which, in process of time, opened all the 
honors of the government to the plebeians. They acquired the right, not only of 
vetoing the passage of all laws, but also their execution ; and thus obtained, through 
their tribunes, a negative on the entire action of the government, without divesting 
the patricians of their control over the Senate. By this arrangement, the govern¬ 
ment was placed under the concurrent and joint voice of the two orders, expressed 
through separate and appropriate organs ; the one possessing the positive, and the 
other the negative powers of the government. This simple change converted it 
from an absolute, into a constitutional government,—from a government of the 
patricians only, to that of the whole Roman people,—and from an aristocracy 
into a republic. In doing this, it laid the solid foundation of Roman liberty and 
greatness. 

“ A superficial observer would pronounce a government, so organized, as that one 
order should have the power of making and executing the laws, and another, or the 
representatives of another, the unlimited authority of preventing their enactment 
and execution,—if not wholly impracticable, at least, too feeble to stand the shocks 



36 


to wliicli all governments are subject; and would, therefore, predict its speedy dis¬ 
solution, after a distracted and inglorious career. 

IIow different from the result ! Instead of-distraction, it proved to be the bond 
of concord and harmony ; instead of weakness, of unequalled strength ;—and, instead 
of a short and inglorious career, one of great length and immortal glory. It moder¬ 
ated the conflicts between the orders ; harmonized their interests, and blended them 
into one ;• substituted devotion to country in the jdace of devotion to particular orders ; 
called forth the united strength and energy of the whole, in the hour of danger; 
raised to power, the wise and patriotic ; elevated the Roman name above all others ; 
extended her authority and dominion over the greater part of the then known world, 
and transmitted the influence of her laws and institutions to the present day. Had 
the opposite counsel prevailed at this critical juncture ; had an appeal been made to 
arms instead of to concession and compromise, Rome, instead of being what she 
afterwards became, would, in all probability, have been as inglorious, and as little 
known to posterity as the insignificant states which surrounded lier, whose names 
and existence would have been long since consigned to oblivion, had they not been 
preserved in the history of her conquests of them. But for the wise course then 
adopted, it is not improbable,—whichever order might have prevailed,—that she 
would have fallen under some cruel and petty tyrant;—and, finally, been conquered 
by some of the neighboring states,—or by the Carthaginians, or the Gauls. To the 
fortunate turn which events then took, she owed her unbounded sway and imperish¬ 
able renown. 

“ It is true, that the tribunate, after raising her to a height of power and prosperity 
never before equalled, finally became one of the instriiments by which her liberty 
was overthrown :—but it was not until she became exposed to new dangers, growing 
out of increase of wealth and the great extent of her dominions, against which the 
tribunate furnished no guards. Its original object was the protection of the plebeians 
against oppression and abuse of power on the part of the patricians. This, it 
thoroughly accomplished ; but it had no power to protect the people of the numerous 
and wealthy conquered countries from being plundered by consuls and proconsuls. 
Nor could it prevent the plunderers from using the enormous wealth, which they 
extorted from the impoverished and ruined provinces, to corrupt and debase the 
people ; nor arrest the formation of |)arties, (irrespective of the old division of patri¬ 
cians and plebeians,) having no other object than to obtain the control of the govern¬ 
ment for the purpose of plunder. Against these formidable evils, her constitution 
furnished no adequate security. Under their baneful influence, the possession of the 
government became the object of the most violent conflicts ; not between patricians 
and plebeians,—but between profligate and corrupt factions. They continued with 
increasing violence, until, finally, Rome sunk, as must every community under sim¬ 
ilar circumstances, beneath the strong grasp, the despotic rule of the chieftain of the 
successful party;—the sad, but only alternative which remained to prevent universal 
violence, confusion and anarchy. The Republic had, in reality, ceased to exist long 
before the establishment of the Empire. The interval was filled by the rule of 
ferocious, corrupt and bloody factions. There was, indeed, a small but patriotic 
body of eminent individuals, who struggled, in vain, to correct abuses, and to restore 
the government to its primitive character and purity ;—and who sacrificed their lives 
in their endeavors to accomplish an object so virtuous and noble. But it can be no 
disparagement to the tribunate, that the great powers conferred on it for wise pur¬ 
poses, and which it had so fully accomplished, should be seized upon, during this 
violent and corrupt interval, to overthrow the liberty it had established, and so long 
nourished and supported. 

“In assigning such consequences to the tribunate, I must not overlook othet 
important provisions of the Constitution of the Roman government. The Senate, as 
far as we are informed, seems to have been admirably constituted to secure consist¬ 
ency and steadiness of action. The power,—when the Republic was exposed to 


37 


imminent danger,—to appoint a dictator,—vested, for a limited period, with almost 
boundless authority ; the two consuls, and the manner of electing them ; the auguries ; 
the sibylline books ; the priesthood, and the censorship;—all of which appertained to 
the patricians,—were, perhaps, indispensable to withstand the vast and apparently 
irregular power of the tribunate;—while the possession of such great powers by the 
patricians, made it necessary to give proportionate strength to the only organ through 
which the plebeians could act on the government with effect. The government was, 
indeed, powerfully constituted; and, apparently, well proportioned both in its pos¬ 
itive and negative organs. It was truly an iron government. Without the tribunate, 
it proved to be one of the most oppressive and cruel that ever existed; but with it, 
one of the strongest and best. 

“The origin and character of the British government are so well known, that a 
very brief sketch, with the object in view, will suffice. ^ 

“The causes which ultimately moulded it into its present form, commenced with 
the Norman Conquest. This introduced the feudal system, with its necessary 
appendages, a hereditary monarchy and nobility ; the former in the line of the chief, 
who led the invading army;—and the latter in that of his distinguished followers. 
They became his feuda-tories. The country,—both land and people,—(the latter as 
serfs,) was divided between them. Conflicts soon followed between the monarch and 
the nobles,—as must ever be the case under such systems. They were followed, in 
the progress of events, by efforts, on the part both of monarchs and nobles, to con¬ 
ciliate the favor of the people. They, in consequence, gradually rose to power. At 
every step of their ascent, they became more important,—and were more and more 
courted,—until at length their influence was so sensibly felt, that they were sum¬ 
moned to attend the meeting of parliament by delegates; not, however, as an estate 
of the realm, or constituent member of the body politic. The first summons came 
from the nobles ; and was designed to conciliate their good feelings and secure their 
co-operation in the war against the king. This was followed by one from him ; but 
his object Avas simply to have them present at the meeting of parliament, in order to 
be consulUd by the crown, on questions relating to taxes and supplies; not, indeed, to 
discuss the right to lay the one, and to raise the other,—for the king claimed the 
arbitrary authority to do both,—but with a view to facilitate their collection, and to 
reconcile them to their imposition. 

“ From this humble beginning, they, after a long struggle, accompanied by many 
vicissitudes, raised themselves to be considered one of the estates of the realm ; and, 
finally, in their efforts to enlarge and secure what they had gained, overpowered, for 
a time, the other two estates; and thus concentrated all power in a single estate or 
body. This, in effect, made the government absolute, and led to consequences which, 

as by a fixed law, must ever result in popular governments of this form ;—namelv :_ 

to organized parties, or, rather, factions, contending violently to obtain or retain the 
control of the government; and this, again, by laws almost as uniform, to the con¬ 
centration of all the powers of government in the hands of the military commander 
of the successful party. 

“ His heir Avas too feeble to hold the sceptre he had grasped ; and the general dis¬ 
content with the result of the revolution, led to the restoration of the old dynasty; 
without defining the limits betAveen the powers of the respective estates. 

“ After a short interval, another revolution folloAved, in Avhich the lords and com¬ 
mons united against the king. This terminated in his overthrow ; and the transfer 
of the crown to a collateral branch of the family, accompanied by a declaration of 
rights, Avhich defined the powers of the several estates of the realm; and, finally, 
perfected and established the constitution. Thus, a feudal monarchy Avas conv'erted, 
througli a slow but steady process of many centuries, into a highly refined constitu¬ 
tional monarchy, without changing xhe basis of the original government. 

“ As it now stands, the realm consists of three estates ; the king; the lords tem¬ 
poral and spiritual ; anc^ the commons. The parliament is the grand council. It 



38 


possesses tlie supreme power. It enacts laws, by tlie concurring assent of tlie lords 
and commons,—subject to the approval of the king. The executive power is vested 
in the monarch, who is regarded as constituting the first estate. Although irre¬ 
sponsible himself, he can only act through responsible ministers and agents. They 
are responsible to the other estates ; to the lords, as constituting the high court 
before whom all the servants of the crown may be tried for malpractices, and crimes 
against the realm, or official delinquencies ;—and to the commons, as possessing the 
impeaching power, and constituting the grand inquest of the kingdom. These 
provisions, with their legislative powers,—especially that of withholding supplies,— 
give them a controlling influence on the executive department, and, virtually, a 
participation in its powers;—so that the acts of the government, throughout its 
entire range, may be fairly considered as the result of the concurrent and joint action 
of the three estates ;—and, as these embrace all the orders,—of the concurrent and 
joint action of the estates of the realm. 

“ He would take an imperfect and false view of the subject who should consider 
the king, in his mere individual character, or even as the head of the royal family,— 
as constituting an estate. Regarded in either light, so far from deserving to be con¬ 
sidered as the First Estate,—and the head of the realm, as he is,—he would represent 
an interest too inconsiderable to be an object of special protection. Instead of this, 
he represents what in reality is, habitually and naturally, the most powerful in¬ 
terest, all things considered, under every form of government in all civilized com¬ 
munities ,—the tax-consuming interest; or, more broadly, the great interest which 
necessarily grows out of the action of the government, be its form what it may ;— 
the interest that lives hy the government. It is composed of the recipients of its 
honors and emoluments ; and may be properly called, the government interest, or 
party ;—in contradistinction to the rest of the community,—or, (as they may be 
properly called,) the people or commons. The one comprehends all who are sup¬ 
ported by the government;—and the other all who support the government:—and it 
is only because the former are strongest, all things being considered, that they are 
enabled to retain, for any considerable time, advantages so great and commanding. 

“ This great and predominant interest is naturally represented by a single head. 
For it is impossible, without being so represented, to distribute the honors and 
emoluments of the government among those who compose it, without producing dis¬ 
cord and conflict:—and it is only by preventing these, that advantages so tempting 
can be long retained. And, hence, the strong tendency of this great interest to the 
monarchical form ;—that is, to be represented by a single individual. On the con¬ 
trary, the antagonistic interest,—that which supports the government, has the 
opposite tendency a tendency to be represented by inajiy ; because a large assem¬ 
bly can better judge, than one individual or a few, what burdens the community can 
bear;—and how it can be most equally distributed, and easily collected. 

“In the British government, the king constitutes an Estate, because he is the 
head and representative of this great interest. He is the conduit through which 
all the honors and emoluments of the government flow ;—while the House of Com¬ 
mons, according to the theory of the government, is the head and representative 
of the opposite—the great tax-paying interest, by which the government is supported. 

“Between these great interests, there is necessarily a constant and strong ten¬ 
dency to conflict; which, if not counteracted, must end in violence and an appeal to 
force,—to be followed by revolution, as has been explained. To prevent this, the 
House of Lords, as one of the estates of the realm, is interposed ; and constitutes the 
conservative power of the government. It consists, in fact, of that portion of the 
community who are the principal recipients of the honors, emoluments, and other 
advantages derived from the government; and whose condition cannot be improved, 
but must be made worse by the triumph of either of the conflicting estates over the 
other; and, hence, it is opposed to the ascend ncy of either,—and in favor of pre¬ 
serving the equilibrium between them. 


39 


“ This sketch, brief as it is, is sufficient to show, that these two constitutional 
governments,—by far the most illustrious of their respective kinds,—conform to the 
principles that have been established, alike in their origin and in their construction, 
'I'he constitutions of both originated in a pressure, occasioned by conflicts of interests 
between hostile classes or orders, and were intended to meet the pressing exigencies 
of the occasion ; neither party, it would seem, having any conception of the prin¬ 
ciples involved, or the consequences to follow, beyond the immediate objects in con¬ 
templation. It would, indeed, seem almost impossible for constitutional govern¬ 
ments, founded on orders or classes, to originate in any other manner. It is difficult 
to conceive that any people, among whom they did not exist, would, or could volun¬ 
tarily institute them, in order to establish such governments ; while it is not at all 
wonderful, that they should grow out of conflicts between different orders or chisses 
when aided by a favorable combination of circumstances. 

“ The constitutions of both rest on the same principle;—an orga|iism by which 
the toice of each order or class is taken through its appropriate organ ; and which 
requires the concurring voice of all to constitute that of the whole community. The 
effects, too, were the same in both;—to unite and harmonize conflicting interests ;— 
to strengthen attachments to the whole community, and to moderate that to the 
respective orders or classes ; to rally all, in the hour of danger, around the standard 
of their country; to elevate the feeling of nationality, and to develop power, moral 
and physical, to an extraordinary extent. Yet each has its distinguishing features, 
resulting from the difference of the organisms, and the circumstances in which they 
respectively originated, 

“In the government of Great Britain, the three orders are blended in the legisla¬ 
tive department; so that the separate and concurring act of each is necessary to make 
laws ; while, on the contrary, in the Roman, one order had the ])Ower of making laws, 
and another of annulling them, or arresting their execution. Each had its peculiar 
advantages. The Roman developed more fully the love of country and the feelings 
of nationality, ‘ 1 am a Roman citizen,' —was pronounced with a pride and elevation 
of sentiment, never, perhaps, felt before or since, by any citizen or subject of any 
community, in announcing the country to which he belonged, 

“It also developed more fully the power of the community. Taking into consid¬ 
eration their respective population, and the state of the arts at the different periods, 
Rome developed more power, comparatively, than Great Britain ever has,—vast as 
that is, and has been,—or, perhaps, than any other community ever did. Hence, the 
mighty control she acquired from a beginning so humble. But the British govern¬ 
ment is far superior to that of Rome, in its adaptation and capacity to embrace under 
its control extensive dominions, without subverting its constitution. In this respect, 
the Roman constitution was defective ;—and, in consequence, soon began to exhibit 
marks of decay, after Rome had extended her dominions beyond Italy ; while the 
British holds under its sway, without apparently impairing either, an empire equal 
to that, under the weight of which the constitution and liberty of Rome were crushed. 
This great advantage it derives from its different structure, especially that of the 
executive dei)artnient; and the character of its conservative principle. The former 
is so constructed as to prevent, in consequence of its unity and hereditary character, 
the violent and factious struggles to obtain the control of the government,*—and, with 
it, the vast patronage which distracted, corrupted, and finally subverted the Roman 
Republic. Against this fatal disease, the latter had no security whatever ; while the 
Briti.sh government,—besides the advantages it possesses, in this respect, from the 
structure of its executive department,—has, in the character of its conservative prin¬ 
ciple, another and powerful security against it. Its character is such, that patron¬ 
age, instead of weakening, strengthens it:—For, the greater the patronage of the 
government, the greater will be the share which falls to the estate constituting the 
conservative department of the government; and the more eligible its condition, the 
greater its opposition to any radical change in its form. The two causes combined, 
give^ to the government a greater capacity of holding under subjection extensive 
dominions, without subverting the constitution or destroying liberty, than has ever 
been possessed by any other. It is difficult, indeed, to assign any limit to its capacity 
in this respect. The most probable which can be assigned is, its ability to bear 
increased burdens ;—the taxation necessary to meet the expenses incident to the 
acquisition and government of such vast dominions may prove, in the end, so h.eavy 
as to crush, under its weight, the laboring and productive portions of the population. 

“I have now finished the brief sketch I proposed, of the origin and character of 
these tvyo renowned governments ; and shall next proceed to consider the charac¬ 
ter, origin, and structure of the government of the United States. It differs from the 
Roman and British, more than they differ from each other; and, although an exist- 
ing government of recent origin, its character and structure are perhaps less under¬ 
stood than those of either.’' 


II 


THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ; 

ITS DEFECTS, DEVELOPED IN THE PRACTICAL WORKING OP THE FEDERAL 

GOVERNMENT. 

[extracted, with a few emendations, from the writings of AN AMERICAN 

STATESMAN, DECEASED MORE THAN A QUARTER OF A CENTURY.] 

“ Ours is a system of governments, compounded of the separate governments of 
the several States composing the Union, and of one common government of all its 
members, called the Government of the United States. The former preceded the 
latter, which was created by their agency. Each was framed by written constitutions; 
those of tlie several States by the people of each, acting separately, and in their 
sovereign character ; and that of the United States, by the same, acting in the same 
character,—but jointly instead of separately. 

*********** 

“ By turning to the seventh article of the constitution, and to the preamble, it 
will be found what was the effect of ratifying. The article expressly provides, 
that, ‘the ratification of tlie conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the 
establishment of this constitution, between the States so ratifying the same.’ The 
preamble of the constitution is in the following words :—‘ We, the people of the 
United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and 
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish 
this constitution for the United States of America.’ The effect, then, of its ratifica¬ 
tion was, to ordain and establish the constitution ;—and, thereby, to make, what was 
before but a plan,—‘The constitution of the United States of America.’ All this 
is clear. 

“ It remains now to show, by whom, it was ordained and established ; for lohom, 
it was ordained and established ; for what, it was ordained and established ; and 
over lohom, it was ordained and established. These will be considered in the order 
in which they stand. 

“ Nothing more is necessary, in order to show by whom it was ordained and 
established, than to ascertain who are meant by,—‘ We, the people of the United 
States ; ’ for, by their authority, it was done. To this there can be but one answer :— 
it meant the people who ratified the instrument; for it was the act of ratification 
which ordained and established it. Who they were, admit* of no doubt. The 
process iireparatory to ratification, and the acts by which it was done, prove, beyond 
the possibility of a doubt, that it was ratified by the several States, through conven¬ 
tions of delegates, chosen in each State by the people thereof; and acting, each in 
the name and by the authority of its State : and, as all the States ratified it, —‘ We, 
the people of the United States,’—mean,—We, the people of the several States of 
the Union. 

*********** 

“ Having shown, by lohom, it Avas ordained, there will be no dilficulty in determin¬ 
ing, for whom, it Avas ordained. The preamble is explicit it Avas ordained and 
established for,—‘The United States of America adding, ‘ America,’in con¬ 
formity to the style of the then confederacy, and the Declaration of Independence. 
Assuming, then, that the ‘ United States’ bears the same meaning in the conclusion 
of the preamble, as it does in its commencement, (and no reason can be assigned Avhy 
it should not,) it follows, necessarily, that the constitution Avas ordained and 
established for the people of the several States, by Avhom it Avas ordained and 
established. 

“ Nor Avill there be any difficulty in shoAving,/(9r what, it aa^ts ordained and estab¬ 
lished. The preamble enumerates the objects. They are,—‘to form a more perfect 
union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common 
defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
and our posterity.’ To effect these objects, they ordained and established, to use 
their own language,—‘ the constitution for the United States of Ameiica. 



41 


“ It remains to be shown, it was ordained and established. That it 

was not over the semral Slates, is settled by the seventh article beyond controversy. 
It declares, that the ratification by nine States shall be sufficient to establish the 
constitution between the States so ratifying. ‘Between,’ necessarily excludes 
‘over;' —as that which is between States cannot be over Reason itself, if 

the constitution had been silent, would have led, with equal certainty, to the same 
conclusion. For it was the several States, or, what is the same thing, their people, 
in their sovereign capacity, who ordained and established the constitution. But the 
authority which ordains and establishes, is higher than that which is ordained and 
established ; and, of course, the latter must be subordinate to the former ;—and can¬ 
not, therefore, be over it. ‘ Between,’ always means more than over ;—and implies 
in this case, that the authority which ordained and established the constitution, was 
the joint and united authority of the States ratifying it; and that, among the effects 
of their ratification, it became a contract between them ; and, as a compact, binding 
on them ;—but only as such. In that sense the term, ‘ between,’ is appropriately 
applied. In no other, can it be. It was, doubtless, used in that sense in this instance ; 
but the question still remains, was it ordained and established? After 

what has been stated, the answer may be readily given. Jt was over the government 
which it created, and all its functionaries in their official character,—and the 
individuals composing and inhabiting the several States, as far as they might come 
within the sphere of the powers delegated to the United States. 

*********** 

“ Those who oppose this conclusion, and maintain the national character of the 
government, rely, in support of their view's, mainly on the expressions, ‘ w’e, the 
people of the United States,’ used in the first part of the preamble ; and, ‘do ordain 
and establish this constitution for the United States of America,’ used in its conclu¬ 
sion. ^ Taken together, they insist, in the first place, that, ‘ w'e, the people,’ mean, 
the people in their individual character, as forming a single community ; and that, 
‘the United States of America,’ designates them in their aggregate character, as 
the American people. In maintaining this construction, they rely on the omission to 
enumerate the States by name, after the word ‘ people,’ (so as to make it read, ‘ We, 
the people of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, &c.,’ as Avas done in the articles of 
the confederation, and, also, in signing the Declaration of Independence ;)—and, in¬ 
stead of this, the simple use of the general term ‘ United States.’ 

“ However plausible this may appear, au explanation perfectly satisfactory may 
be given, why the expression, as it now stands, was used by the framers of the con¬ 
stitution ; and why it should not receive the meaning attempted to be placed upon 
it. It is conceded that, if the enumeration of the States after the word, ‘ people,’ 
had been made, the expression w'ould have been freed from all ambiguity ; and the 
inference and argument founded on the failure to do so, left w'ithout pretext or sup¬ 
port. The omission is certainly striking, but it can be readily explained. It w'as 
made intentionally, and solely from the necessity of the case. The first draft of the 
constitution contained an enumeration of the States, by name, after the word ‘ peo¬ 
ple ; ’ but it became impossible to retain it after the adoption of the seventh and last 
article, which provided, that the ratification by nine States should be sufficient to 
establish the constitution a-s between them; and for the plain reason, that it was 
impossible to determine, whether all the States would ratify ; -or, if any h\iled, which, 
and how many of the number; or, if nine should ratify, how to designate them. 
No alternative was thus left but to omit the enumeration, and to insert the ‘ United 
States of America,’ in its place. And yet, an omission, so readily and so satisfac¬ 
torily explained, has been seized on, as furnishing strong proof that the government 
was ordained and established by the American people, in the aggregate,—and is 
therefore national. 


*********** 

‘‘I have now established, as proposed at the outset, that the government of the 
United States is a democratic federal Republic;—democratic in contradistinction to 
aristocratic, and monarchical;—federal, in contradistinction to national, on the one 
hand, and to a confederacy, on the other; and a Republic—a government of the con¬ 
current majority, in contradistinction to an absolute democracy—or a government of 
the numerical majority. 


*********** 

“ For the structure of such a system—so wise, just, and beneficent,—we are far 
more indebted to a superintending Providence, wdio so disposed events as to lead, as 
if by an invisible hand, to its formation, than to those who erected it. Intelligent, 
experienced, and patriotic as they were, they were but builders under His superin¬ 
tending direction. ^ 


* * * 


* * * 


* 


* 



42 


“ I have now finished the discussion of the question,—What means does the con¬ 
stitution, or the system itself furnish, to preserve the division between the delegated 
and reserved powers ? In its progress, I have shown, that the federal government 
contains, within itself, or in its organization, no provisions, by which the powers del¬ 
egated can be prevented from encroachiiig on the })Owers reserved to the several States. 

“ Nor will their encroachments cease until all the reserved powers,—those 
reserved to the people of the several States in their sovereign character, as well as 
those delegated to their respective separate governments, shall be absorbed : because, 
the same powerful motives, Avhich induced the first step towards it, will continue, 
until the whole is concentrated in the federal government. The written restrictions 
and limitations of the constitution, wall oppose no effectual resistance. They will all 
be gradually undermined by the slow and certain process of construction ; whicli will 
be continued until the instrument itself will be of no more force or validity than an 
ordinary act of Congress ;—nor will it be more respected. The opposing construction 
of the minority will become the subject of ridicule and scorn,—as mere abstrac¬ 
tions ;—until all encroachments will cease to be opposed. Nor will the effects end 
with the absorption of the reserved powers. 

“ While the process is going on, it will react on tbe division of the powers of the 
federal government itself, and disturb its own equilibrium. The legislative depart¬ 
ment will be the first to feel its intluence, and to cumulate authority, by encroach¬ 
ments ; since (V)ngress, as the organ of the delegated powers, possesses, by an express 
])rovision of the constitution, all the discretionary powers of the government. 
Neither of the other two can constiturionally exercise any power, which is not either 
expressly delegated by the constitution, or provided for by law. So long, then, as 
Congress remains faithful to its trust, neither of the others can encroach ; since the 
officers of both are responsible to it, through the impeaching power ; and hence the 
\vork of aggression must commence with it, or by its permission. But whatever 
encroachments it may make,the benefit, in the end, will accrue, not to itself, but to 
the President,—as the head of the executive department. Every enlargement of the 
powers of the government which may be made, every measure which may be adopted 
to aggrandize the dominant combination which may control the government for the 
time, must necessarily enlarge, in a greater or less degree, his patronage and influ¬ 
ence. With their enlargement, his ])Ower to control the other departments of the 
government, and the organs of public opinion, and through them, the community at 
large, must increase, and in the same degree. With their increase, the motive to 
obtain possession of the control of the government, in order to enjoy its honors and 
emoluments, regardless of all considerations of ])rincip]e or policy, will become 
stronger and stronger, until it will stand alone, the paramount and all-absorbing 
motive. And,—to trace further the fatal progress,—just in. proportion as this motive 
shall become stronger, the election of the President will be, more and more, the all- 
important question,—until every other will be regarded as subordinate to it. But as 
this becomes more and more paramount to all others, party combinations, and party 
organization and discii>line will become more concentrated and stringent;—their con¬ 
trol over individual opinion and action more and more decisive ; and, with it. the 
control of the President, as the head of the dominant party. When this shall be 
increased to such a degree, that he, as its head, can, through party organs and party 
machinery, wield sufficient infillence over the constituents of the members of Con¬ 
gress, belonging to his party, as to make their election dependent, not on their fidelity 
to the constitution or to the country, but on their devotion and submission to party 
and partv interest,—his power will liecome absolute. They then will cease, virtually, 
to represent the people. Their responsibility will be, not to them, but to him ; or to 
those who may control and use him as an instrument. The Executive, at this stage, 
will become absolute, so far as the party in power is concerned. It will control the 
action of the dominant party as effectually as would an hereditary chief-magistrate, 
if in possession of its powers,—if not more so ; and the time will not be distant, when 
the President will cease to be elective; when a contested election, or the paid cor¬ 
ruption and violence attending an election, will be made a pretext, by the occupant, or 
his party, for holding over after the expiration of his term. 

“ Such must be the result, if the process of absorption shall be permitted to pro¬ 
gress regularly, through all its stages. The causes which will control the event, are 
as fixed'and certain as any in the physical world. But it is not probable that they 
will be permitted to take their regular course, undisturbed. In a country of such vast 
extent and diversity of interests as ours, parties, in all their stages, must partake, as 
I have alreadv shown, more or less of a sectional character. The laws which control 
their formation, necessarily lead to this. Distance, as has been stated, always 
weakens, and proximity—where there is no counteracting cause—always strengthens 
the social and symi)ath*etic feelings. Sameness of interests and similarity of habits 
and diaracter, inake it more easy for those who are contiguous, to associate together 


43 


and form a party than for those who are remote. In the early stages of the govern¬ 
ment, when principles bore a stronger sway, the effects of these causes were not so 
perceptible, or their influence so great. But as party violence increases, and party 
efforts sink down into a mere struggle to obtain the honors and emoluments of g-ov- 
ernment, the tendency to appeal to local feelings, local interests, and local prejudices 
will become stronger and stronger,—until, ultimately, parties must assume a decid¬ 
edly sectional character. When it comes to this,—and when the two majorities 
which control the federal government,—States and federal numbers,—come to centre 
in the same section, and all the powers of the entire system, virtually to unite in the 
executive department, the dominant section will become the governing, and the other 
the subordinate section ; as much so as if it w^ere a dependent province, without any 
real participation in the government. Its condition will be even worse ; for its 
nominal participation in the acts of government will afford it no means of protecting 
itself, where the interests of the dominant and governing section shall come into con¬ 
flict with its own,—whilst it will serve as a covering to disguise its subjection, and, 
thereby, induce it to bear wrongs, which it would not otherwise tolerate. In this 
state of things, discontent, alienation, and hostility of feelings will be engendered 
between the sections ; to be followed by discord, disorder, convulsions, and, not 
improbably, a disruption of the system. 

“ In one or the other of these results, it must terminate, if the federal govern¬ 
ment be left to decide, definitiveU' and in the last resort, as to the extent of its 
powers. Having no sufficient counteraction, exterior to itself, it must necessarily 
move in the direction marked out by the inherent tendency belonging to its character 
and position. As a constitutional, popular government, its tendency will be, in the 
first place, to an absolute form, under the control of the numerical majority; and, 
finally, to the most simple of these forms, that of a single, irresponsible individual. 
As a federal government, extending over a vast territory, the tendency will be, in the 
first place, to the formation of sectional parties, and the concentration of all power 
in the stronger section; and, in the next, to conflict between the sections, and dis- 
rupture of the whole system. One or the other must be the end, in the case 
supposed. The laws that govern are fixed and certain. The only question will be, 
as to wJdch end, and at what time. All the rest is as certain as the future, if not 
disturbed by causes exterior to the system. 

* * * * *** * * * * « 

“These are all the unavoidable consequences of the government of the numer¬ 
ical majority, in a country of such great extent, and with such diversity of institu¬ 
tions and interests as distinguish ours. They will continue, with increased and 
increasing aggregation, until the end comes. In a country of moderate extent, and 
with an executive department less powerfully constituted than in ours, this termina¬ 
tion would be in an appeal to force, to decide the contest between the two hostile 
parties. But there is more uncertainty in a country of such extent as ours, and 
where the executive department is so powerfully constituted. The only thing that 
is certain is, that it cannot last. But whether it will end in a monarchy, or in 
disunion, is uncertain. In the one or the other it will terminate if not prevented ; 
but in wliich, time alone can decide. There are ]iowerful influences in operation ;— 
a part impelling it towards the one, and a part towards the other. 

“ Among those impelling it towards monarchy, the two most prominent are, the 
natural tendency of the numerical majority to terminate in that form of government; 
and the structure of the executive department of the government of the United 
States. The former has been fully explained, and will be passed over with the 
single remark,—that it will add great force to the impulse of the latter in the same 
direction. To understand the extent of this force will require some explanation. 

“ The vast power and patronage of the department are vested in a single officer, 
the President of the United States. Among these powers, the most prominent, as 
far as it relates to the present subject, are those which appertain to the administra¬ 
tion of the government; to the office of commander in chief of the army and navy 
of the United States ; to the appointment of the officers of the government, with 
few exceptions ; and to the removal of them at his ]deasure,—as his authority has 
been interpreted by Congress. These, and especially the latter, have made his 
election the great and absorbing object of party struggles ; and on tins the appeal to 
force will be made, whenever the violence of the struggle and the corruption of 
parties will no longer submit to the decision of the ballot-box. To this end it must 
come, if the force impelling it in the other direction should not previously prevail. 
If it comes to this, it will be, in all probability, in a contested election ; when the 
question will be. Which is the President? The incumbent,—if he should be one of 
the candidates,—or, if not, the candidate of the party in possession of power? or of 
the party endeavoring to obtain possession ? On such an issue, the appeal to force 
will make the candidate of the successful party, master of tlie whole. 

“ The politest will put an end, virtually, to the elective character of the depart- 


44 


ment. The form of election may, for a time, be preserved ; bat the ballot-box will 
be much less relied on for the decision, than the sword and bayonet. In time, even 
the form will cease, and the successor be appointed by the incumbent:—and thus the 
absolute form of a popular, will end in the absolute form of a monarchical govern¬ 
ment. Scarcely a possibility will exist of forming a constitutional monarchy. There 
will be no material out of which it can be formed ; and if formed, it would be too 
feeble, with such material as would constitute it, to hold in subjection a country of 
such great extent and population as ours must be. 

“ Such will be the end to which the government, as it is now operating, must 
come, should the other alternative not occur, and nothing, in the meantime, be done 
to prevent it. It is idle to suppose that, operating as the system now does—with the 
increase of the country in extent, population and wealth, and the consequent increase 
of the power and patronage of the government, the head of the executive depart¬ 
ment can remain elective. The future is indeed, for the most part, uncertain; but 
there are causes in the political world as steady and fixed in their operation, as any 
in the physical ; and among them are those, which, subject to the abode conditions, 
will lead to the result stated. 

“ Those impelling the government towards disunion are, also, very powerful. 
They consist chiefly of two ; the one, arising from the great extent of the country: 
—the other, from its division into separate States, having local institutions and 
interests. The former, under the operation of the numerical majority, has neces¬ 
sarily given to the two great parties, in their contest for the honors and emoluments 
of the government, a geographical character; for reasons which have been fully 
stated. This contest must finally settle down in a struggle on the part of the 
stronger section to obtain the permanent control ; and on the part of the weaker to 
preserve its independence and equality as members of the Union. The conflict will 
thus become one between the States, occupying the different sections ;—that is, 
between organized bodies on both sides ; each, in the event of separation, having the 
means of avoiding the confusion and anarchy, to which the parts would be subject 
without such org'anization. This will contribute much to increase the power of 
resistance on the part of the weaker section against the stronger, in possession of the 
government. With these great advantages and resources. It is hardly possible that 
the parties occupying the weaker section, will consent, quietly, under any circum¬ 
stances, to sink down from independent and equal sovereignties, into a dependent 
and colonial condition ;—and still less so, under circumstances that will revolutionize 
them internally, and put their very existence, as a people, at stake. Never was 
there an issue between independent States that involved greater calamity to the 
conquered, than is involved in that between the States which compose the two 
sections of this Union. The condition of the weaker, should it sink from a state of 
independence and equality to one of dependence and subjection, will be more 
calamitous than ever before befell a civilized people. It is vain to think that, with 
such consequences before them, they will not resist; especially when resistance may 
save them, and cannot render their condition worse. That this will take place, 
unless the stronger section desists from its course, may be assumed as certain : and 
that—if forced to resist, the weaker section will prove successful, and the system 
end in disunion, is, to say the least, highly probable. But if it shall fail, the great 
increase of power and patronage which must, in consequence, accrue to the govern¬ 
ment of the United States, will but render certain, and hasten the termination in the 
other alternative. So that, at all events, to the one, or to the other,—to monarchy, 
or disunion it must come, if not prevented by strenuous and timely efforts. And 
this brings up the question,—How is it to be prevented? How can these sad alterna¬ 
tives be averted ? 

.;{.******** ** 

“ The means which may be sufficient to prevent diseases, are not usually sufficient 
to remedy them. In slight cases of recent date, they may be;—but additional means 
are necessary to restore health, when the system has been long and deeply dis¬ 
ordered. Such, at present, is the condition of our political system. 

*********** 

“ How the constitution can best be modified, so as to effect the object, can only be 
authoritatively determined by the amending power. It may be done in various ways. 
Among others, it might be effected through a reorganization of the executive depart¬ 
ment ;°S() that’its powers, instead of being vested, as they now are, in a single officer, 
.shall be vested in two ;—to be so elected, as that the two shall be constituted the spe¬ 
cial organs and representatives of the respective sections, in the executive department 
of tliB^government ; and requiring each to approve all the acts of Congress before 
they shall become laws. One might be charged with the administration of matters 
connected with the foreign relations of the country ;—and the other, of such as are 
connected with its domestic institutions ; the selection to be decided by lot. 

*********** 


45 


“ Indeed, it may doubted, whether the framers of the constitution did not commit 
a great mistake, in constituting a single, instead of a plural executive. Nay, it may 
even be doubted whetlier a single chief magistrate,—invested with all the powers 
properly appertaining to the executive departtnent of *the government, as is the Presi¬ 
dent,—is compatible with the permanence of a popular government ; especially in a 
wealthy and populous community, with a large revenue and a numerous body of offi¬ 
cers and employees. Certain it is, that there is no instance of a popular government 
so constituted, which has long endured. Even ours, thus far, furnishes no evidence 
in its favor, and not a little against it ; for, to it, the present disturbed and danger¬ 
ous state of things, which threatens the country with monarchy, or disunion, may be 
justly attributed. On the other hand, the two most distinguished constitutional gov¬ 
ernments of antiquity, both in respect to permanence and power, had a dual execu¬ 
tive, I refer to those of Sparta and of Rome. The former had two hereditary, and 
the latter two elective chief magistrates. It is true, that England, from which ours, 
in this respect, is copied, has a single hereditary head of the executive department of 
her government;—but it is not less true, that she has had many and arduous struggles 
to prevent her chief magistrate from becoming absolute ; and that, to guard against 
it effectually, she was finally compelled to divest him, substantially, of the power of 
administering the government, by transferring it, practically, to a cabinet of responsi¬ 
ble ministers, who, by established custom, cannot hold office, unless supported by a ma¬ 
jority of the two houses of Parliament. She has thus avoided the danger of the chief 
magistrate becoming absolute ; and contrived to unite, substantially, a single with a 
plural executive, in constituting that department of her government. We have no such 
guard, and can have none such, without an entire change in the character of our gov¬ 
ernment ; and her example, of course, furnishes no evidence in favor of a single chief 
magistrate in a popular form of government like ours,—while the examples of 
former times, and our own thus far, furnish strong evidence against it. 

“ But it is objected that a plural executive necessarily leads to intrigue and discord 
among its members ; and that it is inconsistent with prompt and efficient action. This 
may be true, when they are elected by the same constituency ; and may be a good 
reason, where this is the case, for preferring a single, with all its objections, to a 
plural executive. But the case is very different where they are elected by different 
constituencies,—having conflicting and hostile interests ; as would be the fact in the 
case under consideration. Here the two would have to act, concurringly, in approv¬ 
ing the acts of Congress,—and, separately, in the sphere of their respective depart¬ 
ments. The effect, in the latter case, would be, to retain all the advantages of a sin¬ 
gle executive, as far as the administration of the laws was concerned ; and, in the 
forniei*, to insure harmony and concord between the two sections, and, through them, 
in the government. For as no act of Congress could become a law without the assent 
of the chief magistrates representing both sections, each, in the elections, would 
choose the candidate, who, in addition to being faithful to its interests, would best 
command the esteem and confidence of the other section. And thus, the presidential 
election, instead of dividing the Union into hostile geographical parties, the stronger 
struggling to enlarge its powers, and the weaker to defend its rights,—as is now the 
case,—would become the means of restoring harmony and concord to the country and 
the government. It would make the Union a union in truth,—a bond of mutual 
affection and brotherhood;—and not a mere connection used by the stronger as the 
instrument of dominion and aggrandizement,—and submitted to by the weaker only 
from the lingering remains of former attachment, and the fading hope of being able 
to restore the government to what it was originally intended to be, a blessiim to all 

* * * * * * * * * 

“In conclusion, there remains to be considered, the practical question,—Shall the 
remedy be applied ? Shall the only power which can apply it be invoked for the 
purpose ? 

“ The responsibility of answering this solemn question, rests on the States com- 
]msing the stronger section. Those of the weaker are in a minority, both of the 
States and of population; and, of consequence, in every department of the govern¬ 
ment. They, then, cannot be responsible for an act which requires the concurrence 
of two thirds of both houses of Congress, or two thirds of the States, to originate, and 
three fourths of the latter to consummate. With such difficulties in their way, the 
States of the weaker section can do nothing, however disposed, to save the Union and 
the government, without the aid and co-operation of the States composing the stroimer 
section : but with their aid and co-operation both may be saved. On the latter, th^e- 
fore, rests the responsibility of invoking the high power, which alone can apply the 
remedy and, if they fail to do so, of all the consequences which may follow. 

“ Having now finished what I proposed to say on the constitution and government 
of the United States, I shall conclude with a few remarks relative to the constitutions 
and governments of the individual States. 

*********** 


46 


PA.RT III. 


APPLICATION OF THE TRUTHS, 

CONTAINED IN THE FOREGOING TREATISE, TO THE DISTURBED CONDI¬ 
TION OF THE COUNTRY. 

The Constitution was ordained by and established “between the States ratifying the 
same,” by the concurrent act of the people of the several States, united under the name 
of the United States of America, assembled in their several State Conventions. By it— 
the supreme law of the land, enacted by the concurrence of all the States—a government 
of limited powers was created. Without the principle of concurrence there is no con¬ 
stitution worthy of the name. The objects for which the Constitution was established 
are declared to be, “to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure 
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” Without the principle of con¬ 
currence in the working of the machinery of the government, the objects for which it 
was created cannot be attained. Unhappily, there was not provided, within the Con¬ 
stitution, a sufficient organism^ based on the principle of the concurrence of conflicting 
interests, to prevent the Federal Government from assuming powers not delegated, or 
perverting, in their exercise, the powers delegated from the objects for which it was 
established. By reason of this omission, the whole system has become disordered 
and verges to destruction. To provide such ; to re-establish constitutional 

government, giving us a union of peace and harmony; to avert civil war, to re¬ 
sult in the future from the same cause which produced it in Rome, plunder—the plun¬ 
dering of the provinces—giving rise to violent factions, struggling to retain or obtain 
possession of the government for the sake of the plunder; to save the Republic, the 
following Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, based on the principle 
of the concurrence (original and continued) of conflicting interests, are suggested, 
to wit: 

Article 16. 

1. The United States are hereby divided into four sections. 

2. The States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland shall con¬ 
stitute the Northern section ; the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee and the 
Indian Territory shall constitute the Southern section; the States of Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kentucky and West Virginia shall constitute 
the Northwestern section ; and the States of Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Colo¬ 
rado, Oregon, California, Nevada, and the Territories of Washington, Idaho, Montana, 
Dacota, Wyoming, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico and Alaska shall constitute the Western 
section: but the Congress may from time to time, by law, change such sections, as also 
increase their number. On the repeal of any such law, the constitutional sections shall 
stand revived. 

3. On the question of the passage of any bill, order, resolution or vote by either 
House of Congress, including the resolution of advice and consent of the Senate to the 
ratification of treaties, and to the appointment of ambassadors and all other officers of 
the United States, and the election of officers of either House, any State, in either House, 
by a majority of its representatives present, may call for a vote by sections ; and unless 



a majority of the members present, from each section, shall vote in the affirmative, the 
bill, order, resolution of vote, shall not pass such House, or election be made. 

4. On the question of the repeal of any statute, or rescission of any joint order, reso¬ 
lution or vote by either House, any State in either House, in like manner may call for a 
vote by sections : and should a majority of members present, from any section in either 
House, vote in the affirmative, the repeal or rescission shall pass such House, and, when 
thus passed by both Houses, shall take effect without being approved by the President 
and Governors-General. 

Article 17. 

Section I.—1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America and in four Governors-General: the President shall hold his office 
during the term of five years: each Governor-General during the terra of four years: 
the President and Governors-General shall, severally, be ineligible to their respective 
offices for the succeeding term, and no Governor-General shall be eligible to the office 
of President during the term for which he may have been elected a Governor-General: 
nor shall any Governor-General be appointed to any office of trust or profit by the 
President, elected by the college of Governors-General, of which college, such Gov¬ 
ernor-General was entitled to be a member. The terms of office of the President 
and Governors-General shall begin on the 4th of March. At the first election under 
this article the Governor-General, elected by the Northern section, shall hold his office 
for the terra of one year only; the Governor-General, elected by the Southern section, 
for the term of two years only ; and the Governor-General, elected by the Northwestern 
section, for the terra of three years only, 

2. The office of Vice President is abolished : the Senate shall elect their own presid¬ 
ing officer. 

3. The President and Governors-General shall have the same veto power, subject to 
the same provisions and limitations, which the President heretofore possessed, except 
that only a majority, from each section in each House, shall be required to enact into 
law any bill vetoed, 

4. Whenever the President and Governors-General are empowered to do anything, 
or their approval is required for anything to be done, their action shall be determined 
by a majority of voices, 

5. No person, ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to the office of 
Governor-General. 

6. Each Governor-General shall receive for his services a compensation, equal to one- 
half of that of the President, subject to the same provisions and restrictions, and shall 
take the same oath of office, mutatis mutundis. 

Section II.—1. The President shall be Commander-in-Ohief of the Navy of the Uni¬ 
ted States: each Governor-General shall be Commander-in-Chief of so much of the 
Army of the United States as shall be stationed within the section by which he shall 
have been elected, and of the militia of the several States and Territories within such 
section, when called into the actual service of the United States. The President and 
each Governor-General may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officers in 
each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their re¬ 
spective offices. Ihe President and Governors-General shall have exclusive power to 
grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of 
impeachment. All the executive duties, pertaining to the foreign relations of the United 
States, shall devolve on the President: and all the executive duties, pertaining to the 
internal affairs of each section of the United States, shall devolve on the Governor- 
General of such section. 


2. The President shall have power, by j<.nd with the advice and consent of the Senate, a 
majority of those present assenting thereto, to make treaties : and he shall nominate, and, 
by and with the like assent, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls 
and commercial agents: the President and Governors-General shall nominate, and, with 
like assent, shall appoint the Judges of the Supreme Court, the heads of the executive 
departments, and all officers of the United States whose duties are to be discharged 
within the District of% Columbia, and whose appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which may be established by law: the Governors-General shall, 
severally, nominate, and, with like assent, shall appoint all the officers of the United 
States, whose duties are to be discharged within their respective sections, and 
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which may be 
established by law; but the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such in¬ 
ferior officers, as they think proper, alone, in the President, or in the Governors-General, 
severally, or in the President and Governors-General, or in the courts of law, or in the 
heads of departments; and the Congress may, by law, without regard to the provisions 
of the Constitution, provide in what manner, otherwise than by conviction on impeach¬ 
ment, all officers of the United States shall be removed. 

3. The President and Governors-General shall have power to fill up all vacancies 
that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall 
expire at the end of their next session, such vacancies to be filled by the same executive 
officer or officers, as, during the session of the Senate, may have power to make nomi¬ 
nations for such offices to the Senate. 

4. The Ib’esident and Governors-General shall severally, from time to time, give to 
the Congress information on matters of public interest, and recommend to their con¬ 
sideration, such measures as they shall judge necessary and expedient. They may, on 
extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them; and, in case of disa¬ 
greement between them, with respect to the time of their adjournment, they may ad¬ 
journ them to such time as they may think proper. They, in their respective spheres 
of duty, shall take care that all the laws be faithfully executed, and shall jointly or 
severally, according to the power of appointment, commission all the officers of the 
United States. 

5. The President shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers. 

Section III.— 1. One Governor-General shall be elected by the States, embraced in 
each section of the United States, at the time and in the manner prescribed heretofore 
for the election of a President of the United States, except, in the event of no election 
of a Governor-General being made by the electors of any section, the members of the 
House of Representatives from such section, voting by States, the representatives from 
each State having one vote, shall choose immediately, by ballot, in the presence of the 
House of Representatives, a Governor-General from the persons having the highest 
numbers, not exceeding three, on the lists of those voted for by the electors; a quorum, 
for this purpose, shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States 
embraced in such section, and a majority of all the States, of such section, shall be neces¬ 
sary to a choice; and if the members of the House of Representatives, from such sec¬ 
tion, shall not choose the Governor-General, whenever the right to choose shall devolve 
upon them, before the 4th of March next following, then the Senators from such section 
shall choose the Governor-General from the aforesaid persons, not exceeding three. 

2. On the second Wednesday in January, preceding the beginning of any Presidential 
term of office, the Governors-General, in the presence of the two Houses of Congress, 
shall proceed to elect a President of the United States by ballot, each Governor-General 
being entitled to one vote, and a majority of the votes cast being necessary to an elec- 


49 


tion ; a quorum, for the purpose of choosing a President, shall consist of not less than 
two Governors-General; if no person have a majority of the votes cast, after the tenth 
ballot, the President shall be chosen by lot in the following manner, to wit: the name 
of each person, voted for on the tenth ballot, shall be written on as many slips of paper 
as he received votes on said ballot, and placed in a box, and then one shall be drawn 
out by the clerk of the college of Governors-General; the person, whose name shall be 
written on the slip of paper thus drawn out, shall be the President. 

3. The Congress shall, by law, provide for the filling of vacancies in the offices of 
President and Governor-General, occasioned by removal from office, or death, resigna¬ 
tion, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of said offices. 

4. The Governors-General, elected at the first election after these amendments become 
parts of the Constitution, shall, on the second Wednesday in February following their 
election, proceed to elect a President, whose term of office shall commence on the 4th 
of March ensuing. 

Articlk 18. 

1. The Congress may, by law, from time to time, change the mode of electing the 
President, or any one or more of the Governors-General, but shall not deprive any 
section of its equal voice in the election of the President, or of the right to elect one 
Governor-General. 

2. The Congress may, by law, from time to time, declare and provide, without re¬ 
gard to the provisions of the Constitution, what executive powers and duties shall be¬ 
long to the offices of President and Governor-General, or either of them, and in what 
manner and by whom, they shall be respectively exercised, whether jointly or sev¬ 
erally, by one or more of said officers, or by some other person or persons, and may 
also, by law, provide in like manner, for the appointment of Ambassadors, Judges 
of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, or any of them ; which 
laws, so far as they may conflict with the constitutional provisions relating to the sub¬ 
jects embraced in said laws, shall operate as a suspension of said constitutional pro¬ 
visions. 

3. On the repeal of any law, conflicting with the provisions of the Constitution, the 
constitutional provisions suspended by its operation shall be revived and be in full force. 

Article 19. 

A majority of Senators present from each section, instead of tw^o-thirds of those 
present, shall be required to convict in cases of impeachment. The Chief Justice shall 
preside when a Governor-General shall be tried on impeachment. 


-- > -- 

All that has befallen the country, all that is impending, is the result, the necessary 
result, of the working of the government our forefathers put in operation in 1789. 

\ Patriotic and wise, as they were, they did not sufficiently guard liberty against ulti¬ 
mate overthrow. It was an experiment and so regarded by themselves. They did not 
believe and did not pretend, the Constitution was perfect; and, therefore, on its face, 
provided for its amendment, as time and experience should develop its defects. Per¬ 
haps no other body of men could have done their work as well. Some of them, how¬ 
ever, of the greatest reputation for wisdom and foresight, opposed its adoption on the 
ground it would result, ultimately, in the overthrow of the liberties of the people. 
Such will not be the end, if their descendants meet the responsibility imposed upon 
them, and amend the Constitution so as to remedy its defects. With the experience of 



near one hundred years in the practical working of the government, what pigmies we, 
of this generation, must be, compared to them, if looking back over the past, we can¬ 
not see plainly the defects of tlie system which some of them, peering into the future, 
could then see dimly. 

We urge an attentive study of the treatise of our author on “ The Principles of Con¬ 
stitutional Governmentf contained in Part I. We call attention especially to the fact, 
that the Constitution of the Republic of Rome made a distinction between the positive 
power of enacting laws, and the negative power of repealing or annulling them. Not only 
was the concurrence of the two conflicting interests, represented respectively by 

the Patrician and Plebeian classes, which the Republic found in existence at its birth, 
required to enact laws, but also their continued concurrence in their remaining in force ; 
for the Patricians had the power of repeal, and the Plebeians, by any one of their 
Tribunes, the power of annulling. This distinction between and negative power 

is exceedingly important; for a law passed to-day, with the concurrence of both cjn- 
flicting interests, a hundred years hence, by the change which time alone effects, might 
become very oppressive to the one or the other; therefore, either ought to have the 
power of getting rid of it. This feature in the Constitution of the Republic of Rome 
distinguishes it from all others, unless that of modern England be excepted. By the 
English Constitution the concurrence of both Houses of Parliament, each representing 
a different interest, is required in the repeal, as in the passage of all laws. Experience 
has shown thi.a to be a defect, for which compensation has been made in the modern 
practice grown up since the revolution of 1688, now become a part of the Constitution, 
by which the Ministry is compelled to resign whenever it fails to command a majority 
in the House of Commons. In this manner the House of Commons has acquired a 
power equivalent to a power of repeal; for a change of Ministry involves a change of 
the policy of the government. Thus fn modern times, the English Constitution, in this 
respect, has been made more conformable to that of the Roman Republic. 

We will venture to say that this principle of requiring the concurrence of conflicting 
interests, a principle of liberty, (for it prevents any one or several interests, by com¬ 
bination, from oppressing another) will be found in some form or another, applied it 
may be imperfectly, in every government that has ever existed, in any age or country, 
worthy of being called a government. The greatness, prosperity, and happiness of a 
people depend upon its application and is in proportion as it is well or imperfectly 
applied. In the Roman Republic there was a better application of it than in the Eng¬ 
lish Monarchy, especially in this—the distiction between positive and negative power 
was more clearly made in ihe Constitution of the former. Accordingly, Rome devel¬ 
oped more power as a nation, and a sterner patriotism in her people. Her fall is to be 
ascribed to the fact that her Constitution did not extend to the provinces the liberty the 
people of Rome enjoyed. The English Monarchy was saved from a similar fate by our 
Revolutionary fathers of 1776. More than one hundred years ago England claimed that 
Parliament had the power of taxing the American colonies without their consent, given 
in their respective Colonial legislatures. The Colonies denied the existence of such 
power, claiming it was an essential, inherent part of the British Constitution that no 
people, with the rights of Englishmen, could be taxed, except by their own consent, 
and that the Colonists had all the rights of the people of England. This was the issue 
between them, out of which grew' the revolution of 1776. By their successful resist¬ 
ance our forefathers prevented the British Empire from becoming an Empire of despot¬ 
ism ; saved the English Monarchy from the fate which befel the Roman Republic. Eng¬ 
land, taught the lesson by sad experience, now governs all her English-speaking colonies 
from Canada to Australia, including all the islands of the ocean, on the principles of 


our forefathers. These principles, adopted by England, have been abandoned by us. 
The danger to the British Empire is, not from her colonies, which are free and con¬ 
tented, but from the manner of her governing Ireland and the home government of 
England. 

When we come to consider the problem our forefathers had to solve in 1787, to wit: 
how, not two, but thirteen conflicting interests, represented not by classes, but by 
States differing in soil, climate, production and pursuit, could be harmonised under 
one government, each being secured against oppression, it will be seen at once the 
problem was far more complex and difficult. The plan they adopted was to require the 
assent of each separate interest, represented by a State, to the adoption of the organic^ 
supreme law of the land, called the Constitution, which created the common govern¬ 
ment, limited the powers of every department thereof, executive, legislative and judi¬ 
cial, and further specified the objects and purposes for which these limited powers were 
to be exercised. Had the common government confined itself to the exercise of the dele¬ 
gated powers, and further, in their exercise to the objects and purposes specified, then in 
truth each separate interest would, in ratifying the Constitution, have indirectly consented 
to the passage of every law passed by the Congress. But, unfortunately, the principle of 
ih& concurrence of conflicting interests, which was carried as far as it could possibly be in 
the passage of the organic law, only those consenting being bound by it, was abandoned 
in the organum of the government created by it, and consequently in its practical work¬ 
ing. This tends to prove, what we otherwise know to be the fact, that our forefathers 
did not themselves understand clearly the principles on which they were building, but 
that their work was the result, in great measure, of the circumstances by which they 
were surrounded. Had they understood clearly their own work, they would not, in the 
superstructure, have abandoned the principles upon which the foundations were laid. 
They would have provided an organism, based on the principle of the concurrence of 
conflicting interests, whereby the government and every department thereof could have 
been compelled to keep within the limits of the powers delegated, and what is of equal, 
if not of greater importance, been compelled to exercise these powers for the good pur¬ 
poses specified, or been prevented from exercising them at all. This is the great defect 
of the Constitution, by reason whereof shipwreck is being made of the whole. Out of 
this, as out of Pandora’s box, have sprung all the evils which have fallen upon the 
country—out of this, unless remedied, still greater calamities are coming. It is pro¬ 
posed to remedy this defect by a sixteenth article of amendments to the Constitution, 
based on the principle of the concurrence of conflicting interests, wherein the distinc¬ 
tion shall he made between the positive power of enacting and the negative power of 
repealing laws. 

The States, composing each of the sections, into which the United States are divided, 
have such a community of interests, that the protection of the interest of each State 
may, with safety, be left to the majority of the representatives of its section in Con¬ 
gress. Should, however, this prove ineffectual. Congress may, by law, change or in¬ 
crease the number of the sections. The wisdom of such changes being tested by ex¬ 
perience, they, by subsequent amendment, may be made a part of the Constitution. 
With such an organism of government, it is manifest the common government can be 
entrusted, not only with all the powers it now possesses, but that these may with safety 
be enlarged. The apprehensions, which have existed from the beginning, that the Fed¬ 
eral Government would, by unwarranted construction, enlarge and then pervert its 
powers, will at once cease. The long-continued and ever-continuing struggle between 
the advocates of the rights of the States and the rights of the Federal Government 


52 


will end. The liberty of the people of each State will be assured; strife and discord 
will give place to peace and harmony. 

The lYth article is ajjpropriate to the changes in the Constitution made by the 16th. 
It is not proposed to give reasons for its adoption, in addition to what is said on the 
subject in Part II, at pages 42, 43, 44 and 45. We will merely call attention to the 
provisions contained in Section II, paragraph 2, by which Congress is authorized, by 
law, to provide in what manner, other than by conviction on impeachment, all officers 
of the United States shall be removed. 

By the 18th article still greater discretionary power is vested in the Congress, so far 
as relates to the executive branch of the government; but, when we consider the organ¬ 
ism of the legislative department, it is manifest this may be safely done. Any one of 
the four sections, by a majority of its representatives in either branch of Congress, can 
defeat any law in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution ; and, after its passage? 
may, at any time, by a majority of its representatives in both Houses, repeal it. So 
great, in flict, is the conservative power of the organism of the legislative department 
of the government, under the 16th article, that Congress could very safely be entrusted, 
not only with this power over the executive, but also with greatly enlarged powers gen¬ 
erally. The Constitution is not sufficiently flexible to meet the wants of an advancing 
civilization. Our forefathers, in looking too intently at the limitations on the powers 
of the common government, overlooked the more important subject of providing an 
organism, by means of which, the perversion, in their exercise, of the powers delegated, 
could be prevented. England has no written Constitution, nor had Rome; but only 
a conservative organism of government By reason of such organism, the legislative 
department, without danger to the liberties of the people, in the one is, and in the other 
was, entrusted with great control over the executive; in the former, to the extent of 
modifying the principle of hereditary descent, as was done in 1688, and since from time 
to time, of compelling a change of Ministry; in the latter, by the Senate in extraordi¬ 
nary exigencies, suspending for a time the exercise of their authority by the constitu¬ 
tional officers, and vesting all power, subject to certain restrictions, in a single officer. 
The I8th article confers on Congress, with the conservative organism provided by the 
16th article, an analogous power. It is, however, effectually guarded against abuse by 
the provision which requires for its exercise the concurrence of all the sections into 
which the United States are divided, with the further provision that any one section 
may, at any time, by the exercise of its power of repealing such laws, restore the pro¬ 
visions of the Constitution. 

By correcting the defects of the Constitution in the manner suggested, freedom from 
oppression, which is liberty, will be assured to the people of each State; peace and 
harmony will be restored to the Union, monopolies of every kind will ultimately cease, 
and America will become, in truth, the home of the free, with equal rights to all and 
exclusive privileges to none. 


Parts I and II copyrighted and published in this form by permission of the owner of 
the copyright. 





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